

PLANIGLOBII TERRESTRIS

.Mappa Vniversalis

Utrumq; Hemisphaerium Orient. & Occidentale representans

Et IV. mannis generalibus Asiaticis composita et aspectu


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Boundaries

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Boundaries

'The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed.'

Michel Foucault; *Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias*.

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Editor's Letter

Boundaries encompass a range of delineations beyond the geographic: ideological, gender, and class boundaries equally impact how we experience the world. Boundaries became the perfect theme for *History in Politics*' second journal as it both expands and narrows our scope. In this issue, you will find contributors focusing on individual, regional, and global boundaries from the Middle Ages to the present. The articles offer microhistories, looking at the construction of individual's regional and national identities, as well as macrohistory, extending the historical discussion to look at cataclysmic global issues, including climate change.

Our second issue opens with expansive discussions of social boundaries. Alice Addison opens our journal with 'Exploring Challenges Faced by Women: Gendered Labour and Neoliberal Restructuring as Boundaries within Women's Lived Experiences of Poverty.' Her excellent analysis looks at neoliberal restriction from the late 1970s onwards in developing and low-income countries to reveal how gendered labour impacts women's experiences of poverty. She connects neoliberal economic boundaries with class in a broad discussion of how we divide and hierarchize labour. Joseph Callow's following essay also rigorously attends to class boundaries, looking at theoretical conceptions of class, class-based discourse, and attempts of class analysis, he asks 'Is Class a Useful Category of Historical Analysis in the Study of Early Modern Society?'. He draws the conclusion that these attempts to categorise the early modern period are problematic, reflecting later political antagonisms, instead of giving a fluid and representative understanding of subordinate agency. Dr Eva-Maria Nag's 'Planetary Boundaries and Historical Time: Dipesh Chakrabarty's Defence of Shared Political Responsibility for Climate Change' extends our theme further into the Anthropocene by connecting planetary boundaries to our understanding of climate change. Dr Nag's looks at postcolonial historian Dipesh Chakrabarty not as a liberal universality, but as a thinker allowing collective action.

Two of our contributors turn to cultural boundaries within Europe. Bethany Mckenzie turns to look at European boundaries in 'Imagining Spaces: Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth Century Identity Production in the Conceptualization of Europe'. The imprecise and unstable European geographical definitions are connected to individual interpretations of 'Europe'. The importance of the nation-state in invented geographies is again emphasised by Anne Herbert-Ortega in 'How New Borders After the First World War Failed to Resolve Ethnic Tensions'. While Mckenzie's looks at how an individual constructs their identity, Herbert-Ortega looks at how the collapse of several empires in Central Europe led to the creation of the multi-ethnic nations Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.

Maximus McCabe-Abel, *History in Politics*' current Vice-President and President for 2021-2022, looks at the interaction of Europe and India in "Boundaries of Control" - E. R. Stevenson, Indian Colonialism, and the Domestic Postcard (1880-1920). The boundary reviewed is no longer within a region but between two whose interactions are mediated by colonialism. With excellent use of visual

evidence, postcards are used to see how the British empire was represented and imagined. William Guy's 'The Fuero de Cuenca: Legal Innovation on the Medieval Iberian Frontier' also looks at boundary frontiers as zones of contacts. Legal innovations are shown to be changed and spurred by events in the local frontiers; consequently, Guy argues for the importance of placing boundaries within historical analysis.

In 'A Bipolar World: The poisoning of Sergei Skripal and Anglo-Russian relations' *History in Politics*' current President Emily Glynn looks at recent interactions between Russia and Britain. Using academic and popular perspectives shows interpretations of events are shaped by both ideological and national boundaries. Lara Longden's 'Corporate Complicity in Crimes against Humanity: The Role of Ford Motor Company in the Argentine disappearances (1976 -1983)' destabilises ideas of national independence and implicates companies in governments human rights abuses, as Longden shows how Ford and the military suppressed unionist activity. Consequently, our issue ends subtly questioning our presuppositions of boundaries.

I hope this journal allows readers to reconsider their interactions with boundaries when studying history and elsewhere. Our contributions cover a range of places and time, yet, consistently show how boundaries are both grand collective and individual concepts. Each contributor uses boundaries to reframe historical perspectives and question pre-existing concepts.

The tireless and assiduous work of the Editorial Team in the first journal was replicated for our second. Joseph, Emerald, Sophie, and Ariana have excellently curated and edited the contributions in the journal; I cannot thank them enough for their work over the past year. Since the publication of our first issue, we have established a *History in Politics* Board. My special thanks to our Board's Chair Dr Joseph D. Martin and members Dr Lara Green, Dr Anne Heffernan, Dr Skye Montgomery, Dr Helen Roche, and Dr Charlie Rozier for your guidance and feedback. Your direction has allowed us to produce this journal and plan for many more.



Ellie Williams - Brown

Ellie Williams-Brown
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Exploring Challenges Faced by Women: Gendered Labour and Neoliberal Restructuring as Boundaries within Women's Lived Experiences of Poverty

Beginning from the late 1970s onwards, the era of neoliberal restructuring altered the role of the state and the market, which, alongside the gendered nature of household domestic labour, had detrimental consequences for women's experiences of poverty. Developments within macro political-economic policy throughout this era recommended and implemented free-market policies, trade deregulation and a *lassiez-faire* approach to government that encouraged a minimal state role in public service provision. Yet, in overlooking the disparity in the reliance of women in poverty and low-income environments on state provision of public services compared to men and undermining the impact these policies would have on women's income-generating opportunities, this approach intensified women's lived experiences of poverty and exacerbated women's vulnerability to becoming impoverished. The interactions of gendered labour and neoliberal restructuring during this time created boundaries that ultimately limited women's opportunities to escape poverty. Gendered labour refers to the gender constructions that traditionally assign women a disproportionate share of responsibilities within the household, which consequently taxes their time and labour and establishes constraints to women's capacity for earning an independent income. As neoliberal economics impose adjustment costs for poor households, an unequal proportion of these costs is imposed on women as they act as shock absorbers in times of economic hardship. Within the context of these

political-economic transformations, it becomes clear how neoliberal restructuring, gendered labour, and the interactions between these form boundaries that detrimentally alter the ways women live their lives. Firstly, the era of neoliberal restructuring is explained before an exploration into gender roles, gendered responsibilities and the ways in which these constitute borders that disproportionately disadvantage women living in poverty, specifically throughout the era of neoliberal restructuring.

The process of neoliberal restructuring began as the American government shifted from the dollar-gold standard after the decline of the Bretton Woods System and a new framework of international monetary regulation was created that was underpinned by liberal ideas of liberalised exchange rates, free international trade, and *lassiez-faire* government. Within this system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were created with the purpose of financing and lending money to member states to help their economic advancement and assist with economic adjustment. As the framework for these policies, neoliberalism can be defined as a political-economic theory that proposes societal advancement through 'liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework', recommending private property rights, free markets and free trade¹. According to this logic, the state's limited role promotes market expansion, and it is the responsibility of free individuals to engage with the market to escape poverty and flourish.² Within this neoliberal approach to global monetary governance,

¹ D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, (Oxford, 2005).

² M. Katz, *The Undeserving Poor: America's Enduring Confrontation with Poverty: Fully Updated and Revised*, (New York, 2013).

structural adjustment programs (SAP's) were introduced which gave loans to support countries experiencing economic crises. However, the institutions providing these loans also required receiving countries to implement specific policies, including increased privatisation, liberalization of trade and reducing state public spending. Despite receiving widespread support at the time, this neoliberal restructuring is widely criticised for its impact on the social sector and poverty within developing and low-income countries.

The historical period of neoliberal restructuring and the consequential implementation of SAP's generated limitations to women's ability to overcome poverty, ignoring the difference in men and women's experiences and as a result, negatively impacting the welfare of the women. Both the IMF and the World Bank have been decidedly male environments and in the period of the late twentieth century there was a large overrepresentation of men in senior positions³. The 1989 International Monetary Fund Annual Report has lengthy lists of its directors and senior officers, yet not surprisingly, the significant majority are men⁴. Karin Lissakers, a former American executive director of the IMF testified that the Bretton Woods institutions that founded the IMF and the World bank were bastions of male supremacy, and that there lied an institutional problem of gender discrimination. Not only does the institutional element of this period of economic and historical change suffer from deep gender disparities of those in power, but also the theories that underpinned its implementation display a similar male-orientated bias. Theoretical underpinnings of neoliberalism in the twentieth century were founded and supported by well-known male academics, notably, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and James Buchanan. These scholars raised widespread support for laissez-faire capitalism and neoliberal policies, and their influence led to a reduction in state provision of social and public services in an attempt to balance government debt. The male majority in both the theoretical academia of neoliberal theory and its institutional implementation into the contemporary economy

led to the formation of boundaries in women's lives that were not fully realised by the male-dominated establishments that imposed them.

The approach taken by the IMF and World Bank in the implementation of SAP's and their foundational neoliberal theory fatally ignores the significance of the gendered differentiation of the allocation of labour, resources and societal responsibilities to individuals within the household. Relying on limited poverty studies that research poverty on a household income basis, overlooking intra-household differentiation, neoliberalism and its economic implementation resulted in economic hardship, increases in certain areas of unemployment and reduced public service provision. This had detrimental consequences that both subjected more women to poverty and deepened the poverty that many women already experienced⁵. Neoliberal institutions in the late twentieth century endorsed a neoliberal approach to poverty eradication that wrongly assumed whole households experience the same poverty, misunderstanding the differential gender identity-dependent experiences of poverty within households. The approach also assumed that all members within the household have the same means, resources, and opportunities to mobilise their labour to escape poverty. These assumptions disregard the fact that the historical constructions of gender roles and historical biological determinism (the idea that social positions are informed by the biological and sexual difference in the genders) have given rise to a disproportionate division of labour that renders women less able to earn an independent income and therefore has disproportionately subjected them to a higher chance of experiencing poverty.

Throughout history, human socialisation has created a gendered, hierarchical dimension to our social reality. Socialisation of this gendered hierarchy was, and continues to be, informed by a purported biological determinism that is grounded in the bias that there is a natural dominance of men over women, perpetuating the belief that allocating women the responsibility of the social reproduction of the family is a natural extension of the

³ A. Freidman, *50 Years On, 2 U.S. Officials Signal Shift: Women and Bretton Woods*. International Herald Tribune, (New York, 1994).

⁴ International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report (International Monetary Fund)*, (1989).

⁵ N. Kabeer, *Monitoring poverty as if gender mattered: a methodology for rural Bangladesh*, (Brighton, 1989).

biological division of labour within the household⁶. Social reproduction refers to the biological reproduction of the species and conditions of motherhood, the reproduction of the labour force and the reproduction and provisioning of the needs of the family⁷. Historical transformations in the way that society is organised have given rise to a sexual division of labour that forcibly separated and subordinated women's labour in the social reproduction of the family to a value much less than that of the accumulative labour outside of the household that generated surplus value which was generally appropriated by men⁸. These gender roles facilitated the normalisation of simultaneously allocating women disproportionate household and procreative labour, whilst subordinating this as unpaid labour because of its definition as a 'natural' extension of the female biology.

Through this division and hierarchization of gendered labour, significant disparity is created between men and women's opportunities, and the boundaries, to generate income within the context of poverty. For the poor, the mobilisation of the physical labour available to them is fundamental as a means of survival because often, physical labour is the only resource at their disposal⁹. However, the labour demanded by processes within social reproduction weakens the capacity of women to utilise the same means as men to escape poverty. Women, due to the patriarchal bias that defines women's reproductive labour as 'natural' under capitalism, are assigned responsibilities of biological reproduction, unpaid production in the home, social provision, reproduction of culture and ideology and the provision of sexual, emotional and affective services required for intimate relationships¹⁰. Due to the strict fiscal policies of the neoliberal era, women were often forced to balance

both mobilisations in the productive labour force to earn income and their gendered responsibilities in the household. Thus, the societal norm that assigns women as the main caregiver for the family consequently taxes their time and labour, forming a limiting boundary to their ability for earning an independent wage¹¹. In the balance of both finding income to contribute to household needs and maintaining the labour of social reproduction, the demands of these unpaid responsibilities crucially impact women's physical energy, time, and emotional capacity to mobilise further labour productively through avenues that would provide a substantial income. Thus, forced to expend a disproportionate amount of time and labour in the household, women are limited in their ability to generate personal income via a wage and overcome the conditions of poverty. In developing countries, women spend double the amount of time as men on household labour, and four times as much time on caregiving¹².

Despite already constituting a significant boundary, women's gendered responsibilities were reinforced and forcibly intensified by the neoliberal project to restructure the government role in the public sphere in developing and low-income countries. As the debt crisis took hold of developing countries in Latin America and parts of Africa in the 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank manipulated the economic direction of these states towards free-market, *lassiez-faire* neoliberal systems. As a result, governments were tied into structural adjustment programmes which forcibly reduced the state's role in the provision of social welfare services, limited public expenditure and encouraged the deregulation of labour and markets. The shift away from the welfare state approach underpinned the neoliberal idea that state welfare provision disincentivises the poor and encourages

⁶ M. Mies, & S. Federici, *Patriarchy and accumulation on a world scale: Women in the international division of labour*, (London, 2014).

⁷ I. Bakker, *Social Reproduction and the Constitution of a Gendered Political Economy*, (2007), pp 541-556.

⁸ S. Federici, *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*, (New York, 2004); I. Bakker, & S. Gill, *Rethinking power, production, and social reproduction: Toward variegated social reproduction*, (2019) pp 503-523.

⁹ N. Kabeer, *Gender, poverty, and inequality: a brief history of feminist contributions in the field of international development*, *Gender & Development*, (2015) pp. 189-205.

¹⁰ C. Hoskyns, & S. Rai, *Recasting the Global Political Economy: Counting Women's Unpaid Work*, (2007) pp. 297-317.

¹¹ I. Palmer, *Public finance from a gender perspective*, (1995).

¹² M. Berniell, and C. Sánchez-Páramo, *Overview of Time Use Data Used for the Analysis of Gender Differences in Time Use Patterns*, (Washington, 2011); E. Duflo, *Women empowerment and economic development*, (2012) pp. 1051-1079.

laziness in the labour force¹³. Disregarding the inequality in intra-household relations in terms of income and labour, this approach contributed to the formation of even more boundaries facing women in poor and low-income areas.

As state provision of social services is withdrawn, women were forced to devote further time and labour to this unpaid area of domestic work because, as female-identified labour, it is perceived as a natural extension of the women's biological nature¹⁴ (Roberts, 2004). Having a double effect, the debt crisis within developing countries and the impacts of neoliberal structural adjustment policies influenced not only income levels, but also income distribution and consumption distribution within the household. Women, as the main caregiver, created coping mechanisms in reaction to these shocks that deepened their poverty disproportionately to men. Firstly, the quality and consumption of food by women and children reduced to prioritise male consumption as household income became limited due to increased unemployment levels¹⁵. Secondly, in his study Heltberg also found a rise in domestic violence against women that directly correlated with the emotional strain of reduced monetary incomes¹⁶. Thirdly, household assets were often sold to generate money for survival and women's property was generally sold first, reducing their independent assets for stability in future economic shocks¹⁷. Finally, due to the economic hardship of privatisations, unemployment and currency crises, women were forced to expend even more of their time and labour to participate in the productive wage-labour force, harming their physical and mental well-being.

Furthermore, the income earning potential for women in poverty is further defined by

the limits of the set of resources available, and the interactions they experience to acquire income which is consistently limited by gendered labour, and were exacerbated throughout the neoliberal era¹⁸. For women trapped in poverty, social capital and income potential are restricted by deprived neighbourhoods, scarce social resources, limited interaction with only their social class and restricted capacity for mobility. Women's lives become an enclosed complex through which only limited, if any, low-income opportunities, connections and information could be derived. Therefore, initial inequalities between women's capacity for independent income are constantly reproduced because of the constraints of living in poverty.

Analysis of women's lived experiences in developing and low-income countries serves to reveal the damaging boundaries created by neoliberal restructuring and gendered labour, and the interactions between these, on women's lives throughout this era. Women were demanded to extend their labour both in the household to substitute for the reduced state role in public services, but also in the labour market to contribute to the reduced household income as a result of contemporary economic crises and strict fiscal adjustments demanded by SAP's. Women's lives saw extensive negative impacts as they became the central shock absorbers of new economic and political shocks. Ultimately, extensive boundaries were set that limited women's ability to escape poverty.



Alice Addison

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¹³ C. Murray, *Losing ground: American social policy, 1950-1980*, (New York, 1994).

¹⁴ S. Roberts, 'Gendered globalizations', In: Staeheli L., Kofman E. and Peake L. (eds) *Mapping Women, Making Politics: Feminist Perspectives on Political Geography*, (New York, 2004), pp. 127-140.

¹⁵ R. Heltberg, N. Hossain, A. Reva, and C. Turk, *Anatomy of coping. Evidence from people living through the crises of 2008-2011*, (Washington, 2012).

¹⁶ R. Heltberg, *Anatomy of Copying*.

¹⁷ C. Moser, 'The impact of recession and adjustment policies at the micro-level: low income women and their households in Guayquil, Ecuador', in UNICEF (ed.) *Poor Women and the Economic Crisis. The Invisible Adjustment*, (Santiago, 1989) pp. 137-62.

¹⁸ R. Das, *Social capital and poverty of the wage-labour class: Problems with the social capital theory*, (2002) pp. 27-45; R. Peet, *Inequality and Poverty: A Marxist-Geographic Theory*, (1975) pp 564-571; R. Putnam, *Making democracy work* (Princeton, 1993).

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Is Class a Useful Category of Historical Analysis in the Study of Early Modern Society?

The discipline of class analysis has been suffering under sustained criticism since the late 1970s and 1980s. In failing to adequately analyse the postmodern, post-industrial western world, the largely structuralist accounts of Marxist and post-Marxist theorists have been discredited and the specificity of class analysis to the industrial era has been highlighted.¹ While such debates fall outside of the remit of this essay, their consequence, discrediting the field of class analysis as an all-encompassing theory, lends itself to its central theme: that class is a wholly inappropriate category of historical analysis regarding early modern society as it conflates non-class-based systems of social hierarchy with class. This point shall be demonstrated through the analysis of social history, sociology and linguistics and shall be in three sections, first the analysis of class-based discourse, secondly the theoretical conceptions of class derived from the analysis of other eras and finally the specific attempts of social historians to attribute class analysis to the early modern period. Together these analyses will demonstrate that any attempt to marry early modern society with class analysis are either empirically or conceptually flawed.

The incompatibility of early modern social history and the category of class is at first apparent in the absence of 'class' and its subsidiary terminology

from the era's discourse. Briggs' analysis demonstrates clearly that the language of class emerged specifically in the political, economic and social context of the Industrial Revolution.² While some dispute exists over the exact periodization of the emergence of certain terms such as 'Working Class' and 'Middle Class', and which specific factors brought them into discourse, a far more pertinent dispute can be drawn out by contrasting Briggs' analysis to that of Wrightson. Wrightson, in an attempt to challenge the idea of the "birth of class" in the Industrial Revolution, seeks to reconcile the early modern informal language of 'sorts' with traditional class analysis.³

Much of Wrightson's analysis is dependent, like Briggs, on the mutability of society and the discursive change this produced, suggesting that the language of sorts emerged from the inadequacies of the formal language of orders to represent an increasingly antagonistic and exclusive social structure.⁴ Throughout his analysis, Wrightson attempts to demonstrate that the language of sorts, increasingly a language of disassociation rather than differentiation, represents a growing common identity and increasingly similar interests within social groups.⁵ This attempt at demonstrating a 'class consciousness' within the sorts falls flat given Wrightson's preoccupation with elite sources.

¹ T.N. Clark and S.M. Lipset, 'Are Social Classes Dying?', *International Sociology*, Vol.6, No.4, (1991), p.397 and U. Beck and E. Beck-Gernsheim, *Individualization: Institutionalised Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences*, SAGE Publications, London (2002), p.30.

² A. Briggs, 'The Language of 'Class' In Early Nineteenth-Century England' in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds.), *Essays in Labour History*, Macmillan, London (first 1960), (1967), pp.43, 45, 47-8, 52-3.

³ K. Wrightson, 'Sorts of People' in J. Barry and C. Brooks (eds.), *The Middling Sort of People Culture, Society and Politics in England, 1550-1800*, Macmillan, (1994), pp. 29-31.

⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 34, 37-8, 41.

⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 38, 48.

While it may be true, as he suggests, that the language of the elite regarding the non-elite seemed increasingly condemnatory rather than descriptive, this does nothing more than demonstrate an elite and therefore minority understanding of a dichotomous or tripartite ordering of society.

In his attempt to equate the discourse of sorts with the discourse of class, Wrightson has not only reproduced elite perceptions of society but has failed to see two glaring logical errors in his analysis which can be highlighted in contrast to the assessments of Briggs and Jones. Firstly, Wrightson's suggestion that the language of sorts emerged in discourse because of its unique suitedness to describe a changing society contrasts directly with his suggestion that the language of sorts was, "perpetuated in a new terminology" of class in the following period.⁶ Wrightson is implying that 'sort' and 'class' are synonymous terms with the latter adding nothing to the former's meaning. Not only does this seem anachronistic but breaks from the logic employed by both Wrightson and Briggs to explain the emergence of new terms in social discourse as a result of social change. Moreover, Jones' linguistic analysis, drawing on the work of Saussure, demonstrates that social historians generally work within a romanticised understanding of language which fails to appreciate its materiality and, "the impossibility of abstracting experience from the language which structures its articulation."⁷ Wrightson's assertion of a class-based consciousness within sorts of people, despite it not being expressed in those terms, falls firmly within this criticism. The logical flaws of Wrightson demonstrate early modern class analysis to be an anachronism. This is not to say that social hierarchies did not exist in early modern England, nor to say that they were unrelated to the classes that developed in subsequent eras.

But, as this analysis of discourse has shown, and as shall be subsequently corroborated in other sections, the attribution of class to the early modern period is simply a conflation of class relations with non-class-based, hierarchical social structures.

Now that it has been shown that analyses of discourse fail to demonstrate the existence of social class in early modern England, this section will analyse general theories of class which seek to extend class analysis through history on an objective, conceptual basis rather than a discursive one. Perhaps the most extreme of these is that offered by Foster who supposes the innate and inert class consciousness of labouring people, only to be made 'active' by an intellectual vanguard.⁸ The Leninist dichotomy of vanguard and mass plays into the broader theme of Marxist teleology which has been widely discredited in recent years. Giddens offers one such criticism, suggesting that, "where such views do not amount to false functionalist 'explanations', they are simply inconsistent with empirical data."⁹ Giddens' principal point is that the totalising elements of structuralist accounts of class are fundamentally incompatible with the empirical reality of immensely diverse social change.

While Giddens' criticism of structuralism is a valid one, better accounting for social variation than Foster, he himself is an advocate of the idea that the agrarian societies which he describes are fundamentally, "class-divided societies".¹⁰ A number of theorists are proponents of similar, more moderate, approaches to class theory. Thompson is one of the best known of these moderate theorists. Avoiding the principally economic and social analysis of class offered by the strictures of Marxism, Thompson instead advocates regarding class as something akin to popular culture.¹¹ Thompson therefore suggests that classes can be discerned,

⁶ Ibid, p. 50.

⁷ G. S. Jones, *Languages of Class Studies in English Working Class History 1832-1982*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (first 1983), (1993), p. 20.

⁸ C. Calhoun, *The Question of Class Struggle Social Foundations of Popular Radicalism during the Industrial Revolution*, Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited, Oxford (1982) p. 25.

⁹ A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, Polity Press in Association with Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Cambridge (first 1984), (2009), p. 249.

¹⁰ D. Jary and J. Jary, (eds.), 'class-divided society' in, *Collins dictionary of sociology*, (4th ed.), Collins, London.

¹¹ C. Calhoun, 'The Question of Class Struggle', pp. 32-3.

and the conceptual apparatus of class be applied, to a period before its emergence in discourse.¹² Malcolmson adopts a similar position, emphasising the exclusivity of popular and elite cultures and their wholly different identities through the eighteenth century.¹³ These theories are somewhat compelling, the emphasis both theorists place on ritual and collective action seem to be represented in a good deal of early modern social behaviour. Where both Thompson and Malcolmson fall short, however, is that in suggesting that class consciousness is expressed through collective cultural behaviours, their analysis fundamentally devalues theories of class consciousness in later eras. As Calhoun highlights, Thompson's logic that class-conscious activity is not ordered by concepts of class but rather by cultural relations and symbols necessarily leads to the debasement of the idea that class consciousness can be founded in class analysis.¹⁴ As the analysis of Briggs' work in the previous section has shown, key to the development of class and class consciousness during the Industrial Revolution was a class-based discourse and logical conceptualisations. The conceptual attempts of both Malcolmson and Thompson to translate the strictures of class analysis to the early modern period through a cultural conception of class are therefore highly flawed. Once again, the theorists presented here have anachronistically asserted a class-based ordering of early modern society in a conceptually problematic way, essentially nullifying our more empirically supported understanding of the origins of class consciousness in industrial periods. It is therefore clear that these conceptual attempts to assert an ill-fitting class ordering into the early modern period fail to truly appreciate the era's social reality as a distinct type of classless hierarchy.

Attempts made by social historians to directly apply class analysis to the early modern period largely differ from the conceptual works previously discussed, even though they are often laden with abstract conceptions of class, insofar as they are primarily based in the analysis of the early

modern period. They therefore go beyond the work of the discussed theorists, who attempt to develop theories of class which can then be applied backwards in time, in explicitly stating, with relevant empirical evidence, that class analysis is fruitful in early modern England. Laslett's work on the period seems to generally overcome the criticisms raised against the previously mentioned conceptual analyses of class. His hypothesis is that the early modern world had only one class, the gentry, and that all other people were organized into 'status groups'.¹⁵ In this analysis Laslett proposes a social ordering fundamentally different to subsequent eras which overcomes the anachronisms of both the discursive and conceptual analyses. Despite this, Laslett's work is also unconvincing. Having been written in the mid-1960s, prior to the expansion of social history into the analysis of the agency of subordinate social groups, his understanding is limited by a lack of relevant primary material and secondary literature. As such Laslett, much like Wrightson in his analysis of discourse, serves only to perpetuate minority elite perceptions, echoing the views of figures such as Sir Thomas Smith in stating that, "to count at all as an active agent in the record... you had to have the status of a gentleman".¹⁶ In the express denial of agency to subordinate groups Laslett now stands against the immense contradictory evidence of modern social history, the result of which is the complete undermining of his partly class-based analysis.

No such criticism can be raised against the early work of Wood on the miners of the Peak Country. This has an overtly plebeian focus and attempts to demonstrate the potential for class-based organisation within a locality, contradicting the suggestions of Wrightson and Laslett that class identity and consciousness require homogeneity on a national scale.¹⁷ This analysis of class within a locality seems highly convincing initially, especially given Wrightson's characterisation of the early modern English locality as a, "relatively complete social situation".¹⁸ However, it is within Wood's claim that class is

¹² Ibid, p. xi.

¹³ R.W. Malcolmson, *Life and Labour in England 1700-1780*, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, London (1981), pp. 82, 93-6, 106-7.

¹⁴ C. Calhoun, 'The Question of Class Struggle', p. 17.

¹⁵ P. Laslett, *The World We Have Lost - further explored*, Methuen & Co. Ltd, London (first 1965), (1983) pp. 22-3.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 28.

¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 22-4 and K. Wrightson, *English Society 1580-1680*, (first 1982), Routledge, (London, 2003), pp. 72-3.

¹⁸ K. Wrightson, 'English Society', p.72.

reducible to the locality that his understanding of early modern class-based social ordering can be challenged.¹⁹ By extending the logic through which Wood reduces class from a national to a local phenomenon to its necessary conclusion it can be seen to be problematic. While his analysis convincingly demonstrates a free miner identity, his insistence that identities and common practices on a local level be considered formative antecedents to class raises questions over the class status of other groups with shared economic and social positions. The potential for such specificity in class analysis to belittle the utility of the class concept as a discerning tool for historical study has been demonstrated by Reddy's assessments of both Ste Croix and Foster. Reddy highlights the analytical extremity of Ste Croix and Foster who argue that there may exist gendered and intra-familial class divisions, given the distinctive economic and social roles each play.²⁰ A logic such as this reduces the language and categories of class to a position of such low utility as to be almost unusable in real terms, where an individual can occupy many class positions based on innumerable social factors.²¹ Far simpler than this is to avoid a class-based understanding of early modern social relations, not to deny the idea of collective identity as with the free miners of the Peak, but to better appreciate and conceptualise early modern social relations as they really were. Social exclusivity and community were facts of social existence as Wood well demonstrates, but his logic of class ends with it becoming an entirely incomprehensible category of analysis.

Attempts to apply class categorization to the early modern period, be they related to discourse, objective theorisations of what constitutes class or empirical analyses of social relations in the period itself are all essentially problematic. The increasing tendency towards a strictly class-based understanding of early modern English society seems to have emerged from the recent scholarly focus on the political agency of subordinate groups and the explosion of corroborating primary material. The

increasingly apparent parallels between the political antagonism of the early modern era and of later, expressly class-based periods, invites analysis in these terms. This essay therefore hopes to inspire a turn away from such analysis, to demonstrate the irreconcilability of class analysis and early modern society by highlighting their essential incompatibility. It is hoped that in doing so our understanding of subordinate agency and political activity can be reframed into a more suitable system of social analysis which relies on non-class-based hierarchy. Freed from the conceptual constraints of class terminology, a more fluid and representative system of early modern social relations could well be introduced.



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¹⁹ A. Wood, *The politics of social conflict: The Peak Country, 1520-1770*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1999), pp. 8-9, 318.

²⁰ W.M. Reddy, 'The Concept of Class', in M.L. Bush (ed.), *Social Orders & Social Classes in Europe Since 1500: Studies in Social Stratification*, Longman Group UK Limited, Harlow (1992) pp.19-20.

²¹ *Ibid*, pp. 17-8.

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Planetary Boundaries and Historical Time: Dipesh Chakrabarty's Defence of Shared Political Responsibility for Climate Change

Borders are a perennial concept in political thinking, whether real and material or imagined and metaphorical. Here, I draw attention to the notion of planetary boundaries as an imagined border in the sense of being drawn into the future, and that is also material in its emergent reality in the geophysical effects of climate change. It is a concept that has the capacity to shape two fundamental ideas in political thinking of the Anthropocene, namely political responsibility and burden sharing. This essay will first set out in very broad strokes a key dividing line on the question of responsibility for past human actions that have led to the current crisis of climate change. The divide is between those who view political responsibility as arising out of humanity's contribution-in-common to crossing planetary boundaries of habitability, and those who prefer to replace the term Anthropocene with the term Capitalocene. Here, the argument is that responsibility for the current predicament lies with those states and markets that have benefited in the past and are continuing to benefit from climate changing structures of extractive colonialism and global capitalism. The second part of the essay will focus on the historian Dipesh Chakrabarty's defence of shared responsibility of humanity as a whole for the effects of anthropogenic climate change, past and present. As a postcolonial thinker known for his seminal work in Subaltern Studies, Chakrabarty's turn from anti-capitalist critiques to a seemingly old-fashioned liberal universalism is worth exploring. Rather

than liberal revisionism, we can find new ground being staked out in political thinking. This ground enables the encounter of the natural with the social sciences, and justice-sensitive with justice-blind modes of collective action.

What Are Planetary Boundaries and How Did We Reach Them?

The influential concept of 'planetary boundaries' was proposed in 2009 by a group of natural scientists as a quantitative measure of an environmentally safe operating space (SOS) for humanity to continue to develop their contemporary societies.¹ The boundaries are not fixed and one-dimensional. Rather, they denote human-determined judgements about the risks and uncertainties of destabilising the known Earth System (ES) that characterised the most recent geological period of the Holocene, a period that has lasted for over 11,000 years. Planetary boundaries as an idea aims at a risk-aware definition of the environmental limits within which human beings and most other known life forms that are not yet extinct can survive and thrive. This concept has been added to over the years, but the basic forms of boundaries have remained. These are 'global biogeochemical cycles of nitrogen, phosphorus, carbon, and water; the major physical circulation systems of the planet (the climate, stratosphere, ocean systems); biophysical features of Earth that contribute to the underlying resilience of its self-regulatory capacity

¹ J. Rockström, W. Steffan, K. Noone, *et al.*, 'A safe operating space for humanity', *Nature*, 461, (2009).

(marine and terrestrial biodiversity, land systems); and two critical features associated with anthropogenic global change (aerosol loading and chemical pollution).² Major changes to any of these boundaries would have far reaching consequences for regional and global habitability of the planet. In the extreme case, the risks to human and non-human life forms are existential, one of the key reasons that climate change has become *the* defining paradigm of the social sciences in the twenty-first century.

So how was the Earth System destabilised in the first place? This is not only a question for natural scientists to answer but has become a point of contention for the social sciences and humanities as well. Our deepening understanding of anthropogenic climate change has done two things. It has propelled human beings to the centre of causal chains of action and effect. In other words, human action is changing the world and the planet as we know it, but to our detriment. Second, the question of anthropogenic climate change also serves, paradoxically, to decentre the Western-centric, liberal-universalist image of rational human beings in full control of their actions. Instead, the emphasis has now shifted to replace this image with that of enmeshed, entangled and interdependent human societies that are inextricably connected with their environments and wholly dependent on a relatively stable Earth System that has so far allowed for biological life on this planet to emerge and be sustained. A key question, therefore, is when and how human societies made their impact known on the planet by effecting gradual, then sudden changes to the Earth System. Some trace this impact back to deep historical time with the emergence of farming communities. Other, and more influential ideas relate the dramatic changes in planetary habitability to the era of industrialisation that went hand in hand with the extraction and exploitation of natural and human resources on a large scale. Yet others connect

contemporary crises to colonial expansionism coupled with warfare as the dominant form of living. The dividing line is sharpest between the first notion, that seeks to explain change and crises as the cumulative effect of *all* human action on this planet, and the other points of view that are distinctive but connect on the answer that systematic exploitation is the reason for these crises, whether through empire or capitalism. An example for the first point of view can be found in the controversial work of William Ruddiman, leading to a shorthand known as the Ruddiman Hypothesis.³ Ruddiman's assertion is that the focus on our greenhouse gas emitting actions over the past two centuries has deflected from pre-industrial land clearing practices, also known as deforestation, and other agricultural practices that meant CO₂ concentrations in the atmosphere started rising ca. 8,000 years ago and not just 200 years ago. This remains a contested idea, both in the natural and social sciences. Fiercely opposed are those who prefer to use the term Capitalocene instead of Anthropocene to make clear that only a small and powerful subsection of humanity is ultimately responsible for our reaching of planetary boundaries.⁴ Preferring to go back further back in time, political thinkers like Jairus Grove have used the term 'martial Eurocene' to first highlight early modern inter-European and then global shifts to the annihilation of difference and extermination of all but elite life forms.⁵ Each of these viewpoints carries different implications for political responsibility and burden sharing.

Proponents of the term Capitalocene, and thereby critics of global capitalism, have no faith in interspecies solidarity as a route to solving the various crises of this era of disruptive climate change. For some thinkers, like Slavoj Žižek, capitalism has to be abolished altogether before meaningful, positive change can happen.⁶ Similarly, but in less revolutionary tones, others argue

² Ibid.

³ W.F. Ruddiman, 'The Anthropogenic Greenhouse Era Began Thousands of Years Ago', *Climatic Change*, Vol. 61, No. 3, (2003), pp. 261–293.

⁴ J.W. Moore, 'The Capitalocene, Part I: on the nature and origins of our ecological crisis', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3, (2017).

⁵ J.V. Grove, *Savage Ecology*, Duke University Press, Durham and London (2019).

⁶ S. Žižek, *Living in the End Times*, Verso, London and New York (2010), pp. 330–6.

that it will require the solidarity of subaltern groups to counter the economic and ecological power of global and national elites.⁷ These visions constitute the coming together of large-scale structural changes and mass agency. Against this possibly equally homogenised future, thinkers like Grove, Donna Haraway, Claire Colebrooke, and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, among others, pin their hopes on fringe commitments to, “minor traditions, incipient practices, novel senses of belonging, and anachronistic ways of life, both futural and deeply old.”⁸ Grove also lists the Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty as somebody seeking a new kind of social science for a ‘wilder’ and more creative way of being in the fragile world. I will now turn to Chakrabarty’s views on reconsidering political thinking for a new and also very old world.

Geological Time and Historical Time: Contingency and Freedom

Chakrabarty’s work reflects the productive crossing over of multiple boundaries in the social sciences - from South Asian history and literature to Marxist political economy, to globalisation and large-scale planetary history. For him, questions of justice are ultimately questions of meaning, belonging and difference. These are ideas that are put to work in his recent turn to the politics of the Anthropocene. His distinct contributions to the fields of Indian history and postcolonial studies, in particular to the Subaltern Studies group, emanated from his critique of classical Marxist and liberal universalism and rationalism that account for two deficiencies to his mind - epistemological and ethical. On the former, he believed that neither classical Marxism nor European liberalism has an answer to the question of how abstract thought and universal concepts relate to human rootedness, belonging and difference that drive humans’ quest for meaning. On the latter, Chakrabarty contends that the processes of modernisation that stem from

Eurocentric thought were more often than not accompanied by repression and violence, and thus the opposite of the ethical claims of modern Western political thought to justice and equality.⁹

However, the challenge of social justice today cannot be decoupled from anthropogenic climate change. At this historical stage, in which the climate sciences meet with the social sciences and humanities, Dipesh Chakrabarty’s influential contribution to political theory is to welcome the encounter between the planetary and the human. Noting that social scientists lacked the conceptual and methodological tools needed for this necessary enmeshment of fundamentally two different modes of thinking, he writes that,

as the crisis gathered momentum in the last few years, I realized that all my readings in theories of globalization, Marxist analysis of capital, subaltern studies, and postcolonial criticism over the last twenty-five years, while enormously useful in studying globalization, had not really prepared me for making sense of this planetary conjuncture within which humanity finds itself today¹⁰

Chakrabarty posits that a key assumption spanning centuries of thought on ‘man and nature’ was the relatively slow pace of change of humankind’s external environment compared with fast moving changes within human societies. Human history did not appear to have any impact on ‘eternal’ nature, nor did the seemingly slow changes in environmental conditions impose binding constraints on how human societies functioned.¹¹

To understand these connections, that are now that are now apparent in the material realities of the climate crisis, we have to re-think time as simultaneously planetary or geological time and historical time. Climate change is part of the planet’s

⁷ R. Emmett and T. Lekan, (eds.) *Whose Anthropocene? Revisiting Dipesh Chakrabarty’s “Four Theses”*, RCC Perspectives Transformations in Environment and Society, (2016).

⁸ J.V. Grove, *Savage Ecology*, p. 279.

⁹ M. Dimova-Cookson, ‘Subaltern Studies, Post-Colonial Marxism, and “Finding Your Place to Begin from”: An Interview with Dipesh Chakrabarty’, *Dialogues with Contemporary Political Theorists*, (2012), p. 66.

¹⁰ D. Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History: Four Theses’, *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 35, No. 2, (2009), p. 199.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 204.

natural climatic conditions that have changed over the ca. 4.5 billion years of its existence. These changes have also enabled the emergence of basic life on earth, not long after the planet was formed. To be able to imagine such vast scales of time, natural scientists use planet-centred geological time scales, to also answer, “general questions of habitability of a planet, questions to which humans are not central”.¹² Geological time is a measurement of changes to the planet such as the emergence and also extinction of certain life forms. These are known as boundary events. Ever greater consensus is forming around the idea that the Anthropocene is a specific, human-triggered boundary event. Historical time on the other hand is human-centred and not planet-centred, although clearly based on planetary conditions that so far have been conducive to hosting life on earth. It is based on recording, tracking and tracing events that have communicable meaning for humans. Although part of geological time, historical time is recent and is recorded on much more comprehensible scales. Historical time can be divided into deep and recorded history, that is to say from the time human societies began to the time societies began to record and transmit information through written signs. Deep history increasingly matters for Chakrabarty in that it aims to understand trends and processes in the evolution and spread of human societies on this planet. Deep history has a vital role in bringing to the table a sense of contingency in human affairs, thus countering teleological readings of history that foreground European dominance within recorded history of the last four hundred years.

For Chakrabarty, the motivating principle of most human action from deep time onwards is the quest for freedom. The term freedom encapsulates diverse imageries of human autonomy in a creative sense, but also as a tool for escaping injustice, oppression, inequality and uniformity foisted on by humans or human-made systems.¹³ Freedom is also about the ability to work with natural and human

contingency rather than being overwhelmed by developments outside of our control. Many freedoms have a long history, going back to the beginnings of agriculture more than 10,000 years ago. These are material freedoms, such as the freedom to be free from threats of starvation, disease, early mortality, and burdensome manual labour. Alongside are the freedoms to consume goods and to reproduce in large numbers. From the mid-twentieth century onwards, we can track an exponential rise in the use of cheap and plentiful fossil fuels that are used globally in transportation, food production, medicine, and consumer goods. Many of these freedoms enabled more people, including the poor, to live longer lives.¹⁴

This view of a *longue durée* of human history, that contains universal aspirations for freedoms as its *Leitmotif*, means Chakrabarty does not believe that critiques of globalisation and capitalism will suffice in combating the ills of the Anthropocene. It is the current endpoint of an unintended meshing of deep human history with planetary time and boundary events, some of which were favourable to life and some of which, as in the current period, are lethal. Anthropogenic climate change, therefore, “is not inherently—or logically—a problem of past or accumulated intrahuman injustice”.¹⁵ Here, in taking a classical liberal position on the universalism of human aspirations and rights, Chakrabarty hypothesises that a non-capitalist, egalitarian and just distribution of wealth would equally have led to the kind of population growth and growth in consumption we are witnessing today. The conclusion is that the overall outcomes for global warming would not be different but could indeed be worse. Today, the freedoms we have as a result of the use of fossil fuels are now turning into the unfreedoms of hitting planetary boundaries. The viability of our lives underpinned by the simultaneous exercise of freedoms and modes of exploitation - without which many of these freedoms would not be possible - is now in question.

¹² D. Chakrabarty, *The Crises of Civilization. Exploring Global and Planetary Histories*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi (2018), p. 25.

¹³ D. Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History’, p. 208.

¹⁴ D. Chakrabarty, ‘The Politics of Climate Change Is More Than the Politics of Capitalism’, *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 34, Nos. 2–3, (2017), p. 28.

¹⁵ D. Chakrabarty, ‘Climate and capital: On conjoined histories’, *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 41, No. 1, (2014), p. 11.

Political Responsibility and Burden Sharing

What is to be done now and who is to take responsibility for future agency and structural changes to our socio-economic and political systems? Chakrabarty's main answer is insightful in that it sidesteps both liberal-institutionalist and Marxist-revolutionary answers. The former seeks to resolve our problems through the acquisition of greater knowledge and application of expertise, and the latter does this through class-based action against elites and capitalist structures. For Chakrabarty, these approaches on their own are unable to do justice to the two modes of being that characterise human societies. Freedom through difference opens spaces for unpredictability, calling for localised and differentiated approaches to the climate crisis. Yet, the quest for freedom in its various facets also has a universal appeal, seemingly from the formation of early human societies onwards. There is, therefore, a sense of common ground, but one that is not to be found on the basis of sameness of values, ways of life, cultures, and economies. Rather, it is found in an awareness of our species having had a collective impact through historical time, so much so that this impact is felt in geological time reaching unprecedented boundary events and crossing vital planetary boundaries. Responding to these social and natural challenges means operating at two levels simultaneously. It necessitates both differentiated and localised action as well as confirming shared species responsibility. Human beings, in this view, are both political subjects and geophysical forces.

Chakrabarty contends that contemporary political thinking in the era of climate change has to constantly move between justice-based approaches to power, domination and difference, and justice-blind approaches to planetary tipping points that threaten the existence of the human species and non-human species in their entirety. This is not an easy task and requires immense judgement as to when and how these different modes of thinking are to play out in concrete action. In particular, justice-blindness is not a way of thinking that comes naturally to us. Chakrabarty draws on the German philosopher Karl Jasper's notion

of 'epochal consciousness' to show how this mode of thinking is possible. Epochal consciousness is a form of consciousness that arises at momentous times in human history as a, "shared perspectival and ethical space" that is pre-political in the sense of being apart from humanity's divisions through competition and conflict.¹⁶ Momentous times can be achievements like the moon landing or dangers such as the detonation of the first nuclear weapon. Epochal consciousness does not lend itself to solutions to shared problems as much as it constitutes a collective ethical position towards the world. Without this ethical position of species solidarity, differentiated action - whether through institutional changes, whether intended or accidental, whether elite-driven or subaltern-driven - will not halt the collective impact of our species on the planet. Our awareness of planetary boundaries thus connects with a crucial but understated awareness of our own borderlands of human subject and agent, and collective species being. Finding concrete political solutions that match this awareness is the next step, and one that has yet to be taken.



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¹⁶ D. Chakrabarty, 'The Human Condition in the Anthropocene', *The Tanner Lectures in Human Values*, (2015), p.144.

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Imagining Spaces: Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth Century Identity Production in the Conceptualization of Europe

Romanian poet and literary critic Mircea Cărtărescu wrote: ‘There are many Europes in space and in time, in dreams and in memories, in reality and in the imagination. I pretend for only one of them, my Europe, easily recognisable because it has the shape of my brain.’¹ In his conception of the continent, Cărtărescu reflected a highly complex relationship that continues today to plague our sense of self and belonging, that being the role of geographies in the production of identity. Definitions of Europe are not, and have never been, objective. Terms used today to describe various European geographies – ‘east’, ‘north’, ‘west’, ‘south’, ‘central’ – conjure up a whole host of cultural and political associations that have morphed and altered in meaning and significance throughout history. Placing geography under the historical microscope, it becomes apparent that spaces and boundaries that may have appeared self-explanatory and impartial are in fact palimpsests of a host of cultural and social constructs used in part to aid Europeans’ understanding of their place within local, regional and national communities as well as their view of the world as a whole.

The imprecise and unstable nature of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century European geographical definitions stems from their significance in the formation of human perceptions of the world.² As a consequence the fluidity of ‘Europe’ and its regions in their definitive sense generates many different ideas. The existence of multiple

‘Europes’ can be attributed to the manipulation, misinterpretation and invention of European identities. This took place through popular discourse, political intervention, travel literature, region and territory building, and even memory, whether intentionally or subconsciously. The following examines the production of European geographies throughout the *fin de siècle* via internal and external initiatives as well as top-down and bottom-up progressions to argue that the crux of such invented or constructed geographies resides in identity and self-perception. Just as geographies were imagined differently amongst various identity groupings, those identities themselves were further facilitated through invented geographies in a sort of cyclical or symbiotic relationship. Particular attention will be given to the construction of ‘Balkanism’, Spanish nationalism, and the issue of the Galician borderlands of the Eastern Carpathians, among other examples.

Late-nineteenth century geographies were often created through a popular discourse of cultural stereotypes or regional misinterpretations. Such is the case in Maria Todorova’s study of the Western construction of the Balkans as a specific rhetorical paradigm for the part of Europe under Ottoman rule.³ By the nineteenth century, the terms ‘Balkan peninsula’ or ‘Balkans’ were more often than not used to convey political connotations rather than geographical ones, in alliance with the western view that the Balkans represented the more primitive elements of the continent.⁴

¹ Maria Todorova, ‘Spacing Europe: What is a Historical Region’, *East Central Europe/L’Europe du Centre*, 32:1-2 (Leiden, 2005), p. 60.

² Anthony Pagden, ‘Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent’, in Anthony Pagden, ed., *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 33.

³ Milica Bakić-Hayden, ‘Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia’, *Slavic Review*, 54:4 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 920.

⁴ Maria Todorova, ‘The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention’, *Slavic Review*, 53:2 (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 453-464.

Historians such as Larry Wolff have argued this external construction of eastern Europe is a component of or in some way linked to the concept of Orientalism or 'demi-Orientalization' as Wolff puts it.⁵ These sentiments distinguished between varying European identities and led to the creation of 'Otherness' which in turn resulted in the, often natural, substitution of cultural practice with geographical lexis. Perceived as being backwards or primitive, the Balkans was believed to be exempt from Europe, viewed rather as stuck in a development limbo of sorts, 'no longer Orientals nor yet Europeans'.⁶ Equally, geographical colloquialisms sometimes broke down in the face of social change and altered contemporary perceptions of Europe. During the French Revolution, for instance, the republican state began to reprimand local idioms as subnational identification was lost to a hostile state, expanding markets, growing literacy, conscription, and improved communications.⁷ Geographies could alter through discourse on a local, regional and national level. However, these changes can be attributed to a projected or lost identity.

The presumed superiority of the West also played a substantial role in the creation of European geographies. The Western European perspective is amplified by the fact that the majority of *fin de siècle* archives consist of narratives and journals of Westerners' travels across the continent. As Todorova's study suggests, much can be revealed about late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century geographies through travelogues. In early travel guides information is presented as a recommendation, influencing the ways in which people act in particular geographies and by extension the perception of geographies themselves. For example, in John Murray III's 1858 *Handbook for Travellers on the*

Continent he describes what 'ought' to be seen in an highly superficial and formulaic fashion.⁸ This new form of consumption highlighted the ability of tourism to promote national identity and therefore national difference.⁹ Travel journals, written by those such as Murray and Baedaker, gained popularity during the nineteenth century and began to change the perceived geography of Europe.¹⁰ In an account of his visits to the Carpathians, British traveller Andrew F. Crosse wrote that the 'moorings are cut from the old familiar West [but with] all the flavour of the East', subsequently asserting his biased view of eastern-European backwardness onto the physical geography of the region.¹¹ Similar to the process of Balkanization, the bourgeois narrative apparent in these travelogues maintained an air of superiority that held a western-centric view of Europe in which 'other' periphery nations were only included under the geographic label by extension of western powers' generosity. Travel writing became a reaffirmation of the traveller's European selfhood, shown in the textual representation of 'other' distant nations.¹² Here the importance of personal identity within the European context in constructing geographies is again apparent, particularly with regards to nationalization.

Between regions however, identities became trickier to distinguish. For some, regions are ethnic and cultural units, for others, they are economic areas, physical locations, or simply political subdivisions.¹³ The development of regionalism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries therefore became not so much a physical distinction as it was a culturally constructed one. Regions are however most easily determined by outlining their borders, and so the distinctions between geography and identity were blurred as a

⁵ Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: the map of civilization on the mind of the enlightenment* (Stanford, 1994), p. 7.

⁶ Todorova, 'The Balkans', p. 476.

⁷ Stephane Gerson, 'Une France locale: The Local Past in Recent French Scholarship', *French Historical Studies*, 26:3 (North Carolina, 2003), p. 540.

⁸ Rudy Koshar, 'What Ought to be Seen: Tourists' Guidebooks and National Identities in Germany and Modern Europe', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33:3 (London, 1998), pp. 323-324.

⁹ Koshar, 'What Ought to be Seen', p. 325.

¹⁰ Rudy Koshar, *German Travel Cultures* (Oxford, 2000), p. 2.

¹¹ Andrew F. Crosse, *Round About the Carpathians* (1875), p. 2.

¹² Hagen Schulz-Forberg, 'Introduction: European Travel and Travel Writing Cultural Practice and the Idea of Europe' in Hagen Schulz-Forberg, ed., *Unravelling Civilisation: European Travel and Travel Writing* (Brussels, 2005), p. 15.

¹³ Celia Applegate, 'A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times', *American Historical Review*, 104:4 (Oxford, 1999), p. 1158.

disentanglement of entities took place.¹⁴ Such can be said of the Carpathian Mountains which historically marked the border between countries or political entities rather than laying within them.¹⁵ As a result of their physical location, the Carpathians switched hands many times. After the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the mountains became the southern border of the Habsburg Province. But by the Compromise of 1867 they instead marked the boundary between the two halves of the empire of Austria and Hungary.¹⁶ By the late-nineteenth century, the Carpathians drew the interest of various lowland peoples.¹⁷ The idea of discovering and claiming land in this way influenced European geographies through the creation of new borders and the changing perception of spaces. Those who had 'discovered' the Carpathians had seen its potential and constructed new regional identities. As opposed to the externally produced concept of the Balkans asserted by Todorova, the main actors shaping identities in the Carpathian region came from the area itself as they reacted to the political circumstances of their homeland, to create new geographies.¹⁸

Defining the nation-state also gave rise to the invention of geographies. The shrinking of frontiers gradually forced upon the European consciousness a greater sense of the boundaries that lay between them and the rest of the world, resulting in increased nationalism and territoriality.¹⁹ Often this occurred in the process of 'right-sizing' by which political agents at the centre of regimes provided 'appropriate' external and internal territorial

borders.²⁰ Alternatively, internal territory could change as a collective identity broke down. As defined by Charles Maier, the two components of territory are the frontier and the lands within, but a territory may only retain its title as such through a shared sense of loyalty and identity.²¹ Spain began to lose its own geography of allegiance during the last third of the nineteenth century as several peripheral nationalisms emerged: Catalan, Basque and Galician.²² Each of these regions denied the existence of a Spanish nation as identified with the territory of the state and altered the perceived geography of Spain by breaking the country into smaller domains as opposed to the mighty nation-state that was so desired by the political elite at the beginning of the twentieth century.²³ Historian Xosé-Manoel Núñez asserts that the invention of the region in Spain was a top-down process carried out exclusively by intellectual elites of the professional and middle classes and conservative-traditionalists.²⁴ But, national culture does not simply respond to and carry out such initiatives. The nation is ultimately built upon invented traditions which convey a false sense of belonging and affinity.²⁵ For these stimuli to create borders, this shared sense of identity must also collapse.

Yet, shared identity can also be forged through collective memory and in turn construct geographies. By the end of the Second World War, forms of identity associated with the concept of 'European' were being reshaped at Yalta along with the desire to forget the recent past and forge a *new* continent.²⁶ Equally, aims to modernise the post-war

¹⁴ Todorova, 'Spacing Europe', p. 65.

¹⁵ Patrice Dabrowski, 'Discovering the Galician Borderlands: The Case of the Eastern Carpathians', *Slavic Review*, 64:2 (Cambridge, 2005), p. 380.

¹⁶ Dabrowski, 'Discovering the Galician Borderlands', p. 380.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 380.

¹⁸ Eric Storm, 'Nation-building in the Provinces: The Interplay between Local, Regional and National Identities in Central and Western Europe, 1870-1945', *European History Quarterly*, 42:4 (London, 2012), p. 660.

¹⁹ Pagden, 'Europe', p. 51.

²⁰ Brendan O'Leary, 'Introduction' in Thomas M. Callaghy, Ian Lustick and Brendan O'Leary, eds., *Right-sizing the State: the politics of moving borders* (Oxford, 2001), p. 2.

²¹ Charles S. Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era', *American Historical Review*, 105:3 (Oxford, 2000), p. 816.

²² Xosé-Manoel Núñez, 'The Region as Essence of the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism', *European History Quarterly*, 31:4 (London, 2001), p. 483.

²³ Núñez, 'The Region as Essence of the Fatherland', p. 483.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 495.

²⁵ Stephen Jacobson, "'The Head and Heart of Spain': New Perspectives on Nationalism and Nationhood", *Social History*, 29:3 (London, 2004), p. 402.

²⁶ Tony Judt, 'The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Post-War Europe', *Daedalus*, 121:4 (US, 1992), p. 83.

Western economy provoked initiatives to reconstruct the European continent. But perhaps more significant was the changed perception of the relationship between national and continental identity that resulted from the horrors of extensive warfare.²⁷ Feeling a sense of belonging to one nation became an important element in altering identification with the continent as a whole. Prior to this period, one may have referred to themselves as European, rather than French or British for example, but the horrific nature of the war experience reaffirmed people's association with the nation-state and created multiple geographical spheres. One could be Valencian, Spanish, and European simultaneously and act differently in each of these geographies.²⁸ The geography of territory played an institutional role during this period as an 'us and them' mentality broke out between opposing powers through recollection of the war.²⁹ It was a universally-acknowledged claim that responsibility for the war lay with the Germans and the process of de-Nazification manufactured a profoundly different European geography in the loss of European identification with the German nation.³⁰ The idea of 'Europe' was reinvented as a substitute for the sorts of national identifications which had caused such wounds in the recent past.³¹ Europe itself became a sort of *lieu de mémoire* bound in the collective memory of the war so much so that its geography started to alter in spite of the lack of physical change.³²

Defining geographies has formed an important part of the European human consciousness for and has been a determining factor in Europeans' perceptions of the world around them.³³ By identifying and constructing specific European geographies on continental, international, national, and regional scales, turn-of-the-century Europeans created various identities, perceptions of themselves that became so solidified and definitive that their chosen geographical terms pertained more to cultural and political connotations than objective

physical spaces. The construction of identity can therefore be viewed as integral to the invention of geographies throughout this period. Aside from the obvious and strictly topographical distinctions between separate regions, late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century concepts were synonymous with or at least substituted for a sense of identity within the European world. Throughout the period traditional and established identities were adopted, adapted, modified and rejected. The re-invention of geographies may have sometimes taken place at the behest of the elite but only the grassroots construction of local and personal identities could cement new borders and territories. The perception of the majority had to remain congruent with the imagination of space for new boundaries to be drawn. Changing social, territorial, and cultural definitions of group identity fuelled the construction and collapse of European geographies, whether through a common dialogue of belonging, a reaffirmed sense of selfhood upon visiting other European regions, claiming regions as their own, territorial opposition or collective experience.³⁴ As a result, geography became more of an imagined definition of what it meant to be European, or British, or Spanish, or Galician as opposed to location and relative space. This often stemmed from 'othering' at various scales as for one group to claim an identity by geographical definition, they had to identify who did not belong as much as who did. Perhaps drawing more parallels to our current worldview than we would care to admit, European geographies were key in the production of *fin de siècle* European identities and vice versa. And this continuing trend makes one think, perhaps there are not many 'Europes', but simply many perspectives.



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²⁷ Judt, 'The Past is Another Country', p. 83.

²⁸ Pagden, 'Europe', p. 33.

²⁹ Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History', p. 834.

³⁰ Judt, 'The Past is Another Country', p. 87.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

³² Pierre Nora, 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire', *Representations*, 26 (Berkeley, 1989), p. 19.

³³ Todorova, 'Spacing Europe', p. 75.

³⁴ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, 1996), p. 48.

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How New Borders After the First World War Failed to Resolve Ethnic Tensions

The dramatic border changes following the First World War re-sized and created entirely new states in areas where multiple ethnic groups cohabited. The new borders grouped together people of different ethnicities into single nation states which lacked unity, creating conflict between nationalist majorities supporting the state and ethnic minority groups. This essay will primarily consider examples from Central Europe, where the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian empires led to the formation of multi-ethnic Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.

The new borders, put in place following declarations of independence and the treaties of Saint-Germain, Trianon and Versailles, took territory from vanquished Germany, Austria and Hungary and attempted to fulfil nationalist wishes according to the principle of self-determination. However, they failed to create either ethnically homogenous nation states or unified multi-ethnic states, leading to ethnic tensions deriving both from nationalist majorities (who feared the threat of minorities which could act as a destabilizing force) and minority groups (who protested their lack of political power). If ethnic tensions are taken to mean opposition or conflict between different ethnic and/or national groups, then the new borders can most certainly be said to have failed in resolving them. Indeed, if the word 'resolve' suggests to simply solve pre-existing ethnic tensions, the new borders not

only failed to do this but also produced new ethnic tensions. After the First World War, old ethnic tensions, such as those between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia, become violent, and new national struggles appeared, such as those between Czechs and Poles in Teschen Silesia.¹ Historians agree that in most areas changing borders led to increased conflict between cohabiting ethnic groups. Gerwarth attributes this to the creation of multi-ethnic states with large ethnic minority populations and loss of territory from other states, but Drapac draws attention to the fact that in Yugoslavia it was the marginalization – rather than creation – of minorities which led to greater ethnic tension.²

New borders failed to resolve ethnic tensions by creating new multi-ethnic states with minorities within them. The creation of smaller nation states from the territories of previous empires was not carried out along ethnic or national lines due to the ethnic complexity of these territories. Rather, borders were founded on irrelevant historic precedents, which did not represent the reality of contemporary populations. For example, the borders of the new state of Czechoslovakia were drawn according to the historic rights of Bohemian Crownlands. Rather than a plebiscite or other form of self-determination, resulting in the new state containing a huge ethnic minority, 23 per cent of the population were ethnic Germans, which represented a larger proportion of the population than the Slovaks.³ Similarly, the new borders of the enlarged

¹ Robert Gerwarth, *The vanquished: why the First World War failed to end, 1917-1923* (London: Allen Lane, 2016), p. 512.

² Ibid.; Vesna Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia: A Transnational History* (Basingstoke, 2010).

³ Nancy Wingfield, *Minority Politics in a Multinational State: The German Social Democrats in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 9; Gerwarth, *The vanquished*, p. 516.

state of Greater Romania included about 3 million Hungarians, estranged from their homeland and uncomfortable with their sudden status as a minority following years of dominant status in areas such as Transylvania.⁴ This creation of new multi-ethnic states where minorities lacked self-determination led to tension between ethnic groups who had no clear national identity to unite them. In Yugoslavia, for example, the different national groups including Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, had no shared Yugoslav identity to unite them; certain groups, such as the Croats and Macedonians, feared that their inclusion in this multi-ethnic state threatened their 'existence as distinctive peoples'.⁵ This reluctance of minorities to be included in new nation states is also evident in the aversion of Hungarians in Transylvania at becoming a minority under the new Greater Romania. Despite statements by the Romanian government that minorities would be protected, almost two hundred thousand fled as refugees to the smaller new state of Hungary.⁶ These examples indicate how new borders, in creating multi-ethnic states, fuelled fear and tension between ethnic groups.

The new borders also failed to resolve ethnic tensions within these new multi-ethnic states, as they did not grant equal power to each ethnic group. It was implicit in the creation of these united nations with a united national identity that the largest ethnic or national group would have the majority in united parliament, where they would consistently outnumber – and therefore outvote – minority groups, giving them a huge amount of political power and leaving ethnic minorities marginalized. This can be seen in the example of Yugoslavia. Drapac argues that Yugoslavia was not doomed from the start, which is convincing in light of the fact that even the minority Croat leader Stjepan Radić accepted the state.⁷ He opposed, however, the Serbian domination in the state, as the Croats were

a permanent parliamentary minority which the Serbs could consistently outvote.⁸ The result of this dissatisfaction was his petition with over 115,000 signatures sent to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, requesting international support for the Croats' right to self-determination.⁹ This is a clear indicator that the new borders failed to resolve ethnic tensions through their marginalization of minority groups who lost power in the new multi-ethnic states.

The real problem for the Croats was not their assimilation into the multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia, but their loss of the significant autonomy they had been granted under Austro-Hungarian rule. The Slovenes, who had been assimilated into Yugoslavia just as the Croats had, were happy to cohabit with the Serbs, as their position in Yugoslavia was an improvement from their previous fragmentation. They had previously had no autonomy, and were now represented in government, with the power to self-administer their Slovenian territory.¹⁰ The only difference for the Croats was that in being included in Yugoslavia they had lost power. The same difficulty with the marginalization of an ethnic minority bringing about greater ethnic tensions can be seen in the new state of Czechoslovakia, where land reform in 1921 did not distinguish between ethnic groups, unifying them all under a single nationality – and as a result affected Hungarian land-owning nobility in Transylvania disproportionately, with much of their land being handed over to Romanian peasants.¹¹

It is also worth considering ethnic tensions in states within whose new borders there was little ethnic diversity. Despite their ethnic homogeneity in comparison to other states, the loss of territory to countries such as Germany and Hungary produced nationalist concerns over regaining these lost territories, which in turn bred hostility towards other ethnic groups. An example of the effect of these new borders is the evolution of the

⁴ Ibid., p. 517.

⁵ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, p. 96; Ibid., p. 109.

⁶ Holly Case, 'The "Transylvanian Question" and European Statehood', in *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II* (Stanford, 2009), p. 27.

⁷ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, p. 96; Ibid., p. 112.

⁸ Ibid., p. 112.

⁹ Ibid., p. 111.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 109.

¹¹ Case, 'The "Transylvanian Question"', p. 27.

Friedrich Wilhelms University in Breslau (Germany). This changed from a traditionally cosmopolitan institution with many ethnic minority Polish and Jewish students, to a focal point for German nationalists hostile to the cohabitation of different ethnic groups. The popularity at the university of Walter Kuhn, who lectured on the need to reverse the Treaty of Versailles and recover 'lost' German populations in Poland and Central Europe, shows how the new borders created by treaties after the First World War led to this popular irredentist movement in areas such as Breslau.¹² The resentment towards the new borders in turn fueled right-wing nationalism at the University, which brought with it greater hostility towards Breslau's ethnic minority populations.

Another source of ethnic tension in the more ethnically homogeneous states was the presence of refugees from lost territories, who put pressure on their governments to regain their native lands. Both Case and Gerhart agree on the importance of refugees in Hungary, where Gerhart describes the 420,000 refugees from lost territories as a 'radicalizing presence'.¹³ This description may be somewhat exaggerated however, as Case shows that Hungarian leaders took little diplomatic action to regain lost territories.¹⁴ To some extent however the refugees contributed to ethnic tension: refugees from areas such as Transylvania struggled to find employment in the smaller new Hungary, and their dissatisfaction manifested in constant activism, lobbying for the reversal of the Treaty of Trianon. In this way, the new borders put in place following the First World War encouraged a particular breed of nationalism which created new ethnic tensions in German and Hungarian concerns over lost territories and displaced populations. Due to their greater national unity and lack of significant minority populations, ethnically homogeneous states might be expected not to have experienced escalated ethnic tensions following the changes to borders. However, internal pressure from

nationalists and refugees wanting to expand the nation state beyond the new borders catalysed more fervent ethnic tension.

In considering these examples of post-war changes to borders in Central Europe – as ethnic tensions may have originated differently in areas such as Belarus and Ukraine, which have not been covered here – it seems clear that the ethnic tensions which arose in the interwar period were caused by the redistribution of power between ethnic groups. Before the First World War, ethnic tensions had existed, but within looser structures such as the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Empire they had not been as observable. With the new borders creating new nation states and the marginalisation of previously more powerful or autonomous ethnic groups such as the Germans in Bohemia, Hungarians in Transylvania and Croats, ethnic conflicts were catalysed by the desire to fight for lost territory and political autonomy.

The change from multi-ethnic empires to multi-ethnic nation states was instrumental in the new borders' failure to resolve ethnic tension. It caused the significant increase in ethnic conflict because of the marginalisation of groups within those multi-ethnic nation states, and the subsequent, similarly threatening loss of territory for certain national groups. Political power and autonomy were key points of contention for the new multi-ethnic nation states. Certain groups, such as the Croats, were perfectly happy to exist within a multinational state as they had done before – they only opposed Yugoslavia because they had been marginalised within it.¹⁵



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¹² Gerwarth, *The Vanquished*, p. 514.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 513.

¹⁴ Case, "The "Transylvanian Question".

¹⁵ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, p. 96; *Ibid.*, p. 112.

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'Boundaries of Control' – E.R. Stevenson, Indian Colonialism, and the Domestic Postcard (1880-1920)

The boundary between colonial territories and their European colonisers was one frequently traversed by the picture postcard. As a prolific object forging a connection between the continents in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Emily Rose Stevenson has posited that the postcard's materiality facilitated the popular visual representation of the British empire and its colonies, fuelling Edward Said's contention of 'imagined geographies'.¹ Within her 2013 journal article, titled with the British idiom, 'Home, Sweet Home', Stevenson considers the colonial Indian postcard, particularly those which portray the domestic sphere, and how the British utilised the medium to perpetuate the European 'fantasy of classist aspirations and increased domestic power'² by depicting Indians as uncivilised, subordinate and socially primitive. However, whilst Stevenson's photographic sources reflect the Indian home, or what she considers its 'micro' sphere, it is clear that the image of India's inferior domestic space also became inculcated in the fabrication of Britain's wider 'macro' image as a dominant colonial power. As Steve Edwards elucidates, 'the photographic document was one means through which the colonial powers envisaged their difference from their colonised subjects'³, which is exemplified particularly within the material sources cited by Stevenson. For example, countless contemporary postcards reflect

the emasculation of the Indian male figure to juxtapose the hyper-masculine British cultural aesthetic, and simultaneously present the indigenous Indian woman as destitute and infantile, yet capable of liberation by the guidance and education of the white female saviour. Furthermore, it was not uncommon for British citizens living in India to send postcards depicting photographs of their indigenous servants back to their friends and relatives as a way of conveying a sense of their elevated social rank and command over their racial subordinates. The materiality of the postcard, which became an overwhelmingly prolific and fluid object of photographic communication in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, facilitated these visual representations of India, fuelling the image of British imperial supremacy. Corroborating this argument, the historical anthropologist E. Edwards employs a 'material hermeneutic'⁴ in her study, stressing that the postcard's three-dimensional nature enabled the notion of India's supposed primitivism to circulate across international boundaries. In Stevenson's context, it is clear that the postcard became implicated on both 'micro' and 'macro' levels by projecting images of India's supposedly inferior domestic space, and thereby contributing to the broader British colonial fantasy of possession and control.

Viewing the postcard as a material object is

¹ E. Said, *Orientalism*, (Penguin Books, 1991), p. 49.

² E.R. Stevenson, 'Home, Sweet Home: Women and the "Other Space" of Domesticity in Colonial Indian Postcards, ca. 1820-1920', *Visual Anthropology*, vol. 26, no. 4 (2013), p. 307.

³ S. Edwards, *Photography: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 24.

⁴ E. Edwards, 'Photography and the Material Performance of the Past', *History and Theory*, vol. 48, no. 4 (2009), p. 149.

a central tenet of both Stevenson's 2013 article and her wider scholarship. In a paper co-authored with S. Hughes, she argues that it is commonly assumed that 'the rapid and large-scale circulation of photographic images is a uniquely twenty-first century phenomenon.'⁵ However, the postcard constituted an early yet prolific means of social and photographic communication, eclipsing the *carte-de-visite* and the cabinet card to become the most widely circulated visual medium of the period. Whilst Stevenson contends that their 'status as ephemeral items of popular culture and communication'⁶ traditionally resulted in a historical neglect of their social significance, its material nature allowed it to traverse social, economic and cultural boundaries. In 1913 alone, it appears that over 903 million postcards were sent in Britain. Given that the British population at the beginning of the twentieth century was approximately forty-six million⁷, it appears that twenty postcards were sent on average per person in 1913, and the amount sent from India to Britain was also substantive. The medium was relatively cheap to send and quick to arrive, with the inclusion of the photograph on one side allowing images to travel to Britain. Whilst the historiography of M. Alloula – centring on French colonial Algeria and the postcard as an object of imperial ideology and sexualisation of the indigenous population – has largely been challenged for perpetuating the heterosexual fantasy it aims to redress, his scholarship does emphasise the complex web of communication encouraged by the postcard, bridging 'social fields, continents and genders'⁸. In the case of Stevenson, Indian postcards from 1880-1920 allowed the notion of British supremacy to be reinforced between the two nations, encouraging social and racial comparisons between the coloniser and the colonised. As suggested by scholars like C.J. Pinney, photography served as a

means of 'solidifying an image of Indians as racially inferior'⁹, with Stevenson's postcards in particular highlighting the differences between the domestic spaces of India and Britain. However, the portrayal of the domestic site undoubtedly provides a wider commentary on the 'macro' image of India as an uncivilised state benefitting from colonial domination – A. Blunt has articulated that 'empire and home were virtually interchangeable terms'¹⁰. For example, a colourised postcard (Fig. 1) which exemplifies this applies the British idiom, 'Home, Sweet Home' onto an Indian family photograph, which with its strong connotations to British idealised domesticity, prompts a cultural comparison between the two states and 'metaphorically alludes to colonial efforts to transpose British familial norms to Indian domesticity.'¹¹ Furthermore, given that the caption to this postcard is written in English and not the vernacular language, it underscores the intended audience as the British middle-class who presumably would consider the locution, 'Home, Sweet Home' humorous in comparison to their own 'civilised' domestic setting.




Figure 1 SEQ Figure * ARABIC 1 'Home, Sweet Home'.
Date unknown. Chennai, Tamil Nadu

⁵ S. Hughes & E.R. Stevenson, 'South India Addresses the World: Postcards, Circulation, and Empire', *Circulation*, vol. 9, iss. 2, (2019), p. 1.

⁶ Stevenson, 'Home, Sweet Home', p. 300.

⁷ A. Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective*, (OECD Publications, 2001), p. 183.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

¹⁰ A. Blunt, cited in I. Sen, 'Colonial Domesticities, Contentious Interactions: Ayahs, Wet Nurses and Memsahibs in Colonial India', *Indian Journal of Gender Studies*, vol. 16, iss. 3 (2009), p. 300.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

However, one of the central visual representations of empire that Stevenson notes was facilitated by the postcard was the emasculation of the indigenous male figure. Through their subordinate presentation within the Indian home, the postcard tapped into the broader imperial ideology whereby the stereotypical British norms of hyper-masculinity were juxtaposed against the feminised Indian male. Hughes and Stevenson argue that contemporary postcards emphasised the subservience of the Indian male, and that 'there is a clear racialised mockery implicit [...] as the viewer is invited to find humour in the incongruous image of a "native" adopting "civilised" habits¹²'. A particular postcard (Fig. 2) presents the dichotomy between a British matriarch and a physically lean and half-dressed Indian man, evoking a cultural technique that relegates the latter to the conventionally female domestic environment and reflects the tradition where 'images of the colonial Other are overwhelmingly predicated on an idea of essential racial difference and a concomitant vision of racial supremacy¹³.' By presenting the Indian as unworthy of comparison with male British attributes, and substituting conventional gender hierarchies with racial hierarchies, this domiciliary, 'micro' postcard becomes inculcated in the wider, 'macro' fabrication of Britain's imperial identity. Moreover, Stevenson notes that within this postcard, the Indian home, as a microcosm of the nation itself, is depicted as disorganised, dangerous and technologically backward, with the physical side-by-side layout of the postcard encouraging comparison with the modern, measured and well-organised British kitchen. As a by-product of its materiality and subsequent wide circulation, it allowed the iconography of Indian subordination to permeate British consciousness and subsequently fuel the cultural image of imperial supremacy.

On the other hand, the postcard also lent itself to the visual representation and imagination of empire through photographs of Indian servants, which were circulated by the British in India.

It was through this convention that, frequently memsahibs, sent postcards depicting Indian servants back to their friends and relations in Britain as evidence that they had attained a higher social rank, articulating the white 'fantasy of higher social status¹⁴'. In an article¹⁵ by M.A. Jain which looks at an exhibition of postcards sent from India to Europe between 1900 and the 1930s, for which Stevenson offered several sources from her private collection, the author draws an effective parallel between colonial era postcards and twenty-first century social networking platforms, which, like the British in India, allow us to rapidly share elements of our social lives. Within her article, Stevenson adduces several contemporary postcards that refer to the images of servants using the possessive pronoun, 'our', which through its 'pronouncement of ownership¹⁶' connotes a strong sense of custodial control. It was thereby this image of India which travelled back to Britain and fuelled the popular imagination of empire through the visual degradation of the indigenous people and comparison with the civilised colonial power.




Figure 2 SEQ Figure * ARABIC 2 'East and West Series: How Our Food is Cooked'. Date unknown. Calcutta, India, printed in Britain. Thacker, Spink & Co.

Furthermore, the representation of indigenous women and the female body in contemporary postcards, as destitute and infantile, was also highly

¹² Hughes & Stevenson, 'South India Addresses the World', p. 26.

¹³ Edwards, *Photography: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 24.

¹⁴ Stevenson, 'Home, Sweet Home', p. 307.

¹⁵ M.A. Jain, 'Racism and stereotypes in colonial India's 'Instagram'', *BBC*, 30 September 2018.

¹⁶ Stevenson, 'Home, Sweet Home', p. 307.

significant in the fabrication of India's colonial identity. Stevenson considers several postcards which engineer the image of Indian women as primordial, 'yet capable of being raised and liberated through British female intervention.'¹⁷ It appears to be no coincidence that within a postcard (Fig. 3) which depicts an outdoor domestic scene in the Indian town of Palamcottah, the photographed infant is labelled as 'blind, deaf and dumb'. Encapsulating all the characteristics the British sought to symbolically ascribe to the colonial population, this postcard widens the cultural gulf between the ostensibly primitive Indian population, and their educated, capable colonisers. The issue of Indian female ignorance is presented as remediable by the involvement of white memsahibs who would introduce 'civilised' values to them, echoing the British upper-class convention of female philanthropists taking it upon themselves to extricate the sexually and thus, morally, corrupt 'fallen women' from socio-economic degeneracy. These postcards, which pit British civility against Indian ignorance, subscribe to the contrived 'native type' photography, and reflect what Stevenson has described as a 'conscious construction'¹⁸ of India's subordinate domestic identity and subsequent inferiority in the imperial hierarchy. Furthermore, a recurring trope of these postcards and colonial imagery is the presentation of the female indigenous body as a symbol of control. A modern photograph by Pushpamala N., from her 'Native Women of South India' project (Fig. 4) revives the photographic technique associated with the colonial obsession with racial categorisation and analysis of the indigenous body by framing it by a gridded background. The native body, particularly the female form, served as a pertinent symbol of imperial power – if the British could obtain mastery over the indigenous body, then they could gain mastery over the nation. This portrayal of the indigenous female form is reflected throughout contemporary Indian postcards, where the frequent sexualisation of its subjects serve as a visual manifestation of the white desire to exert control over the native body, and thereby reinforce its authority over the colonial state as a whole.



Figure 3 SEQ Figure * ARABIC 3 'Blind, deaf and dumb Pyari with Miss Swainson'. Date unknown. Church of England Zenana Missionary Society, 27 Chancery Lane, London.



Figure 4 'Toda'. 2000-2003. From Pushpamala N's *Native Women of South India*. Gelatin silver photograph.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 313.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

To surmise, the postcard can be considered one of the central ways in which the British empire was represented and imagined in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Whilst Stevenson's analysis focuses on the photographic delineation of the Indian domestic, 'micro' sphere, and its portrayal as uncivilised, it is clear that the indigenous home, as a microcosm of the nation itself, reinforced the construction of India's 'macro' imperial image. As a three-dimensional, fluid object with a social 'life', the materiality of the postcard was responsible for disseminating the enduring images of empire. The sources cited by Stevenson reflect the emasculation of the Indian male figure to contradict the hyper-masculine British ideal, and present indigenous Indian women as benighted, puerile individuals freed from social crudity by the guidance of the white female liberator. Therefore, as E.R. Stevenson articulates, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the postcard, as a highly prolific instrument of photographic networking, became implicated in the visual representation of empire by invoking the image of British superior domestic power and thereby articulating the colonial fantasy of control.



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The Fuero de Cuenca: Legal Innovation on the Medieval Iberian Frontier

Ever since Frederick Turner's groundbreaking essay on 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History' in 1893, the frontier concept has fascinated historians of every period and region.¹ More than simply boundaries between countries and societies, frontiers are zones of contact. For scholars of medieval Iberia, therefore, the frontier did not merely demarcate Christendom from the Islamic world. It was also an arena of intense social encounters that gave rise to a number of significant cultural developments on the Peninsula.²

One particularly intriguing avenue of inquiry focuses on the emergence of a new legal framework in the nascent Spanish kingdoms of Castile and Aragon during the 12th and 13th centuries, forced by the unique challenges and opportunities presented by the *Reconquista*. Ongoing war between Christian and Muslim realms created an environment where creative forms of regulation were required to both defend and advance an ever-changing frontier.

Here, I examine the local forces that shaped this emergent legal system, which took

the form of so-called municipal *fueros*. Homing in on the remodelled law of Cuenca, a small but significant town of central La Mancha, I explore two local frontier authorities who gained prominence in what was a combative environment that rewarded the militarily capable.

Frontier *Fueros*

The municipal *fueros* have long been recognised as invaluable resources for historians of medieval Iberia.³ They grew out of the need for a new legal framework in post-conflict society as Christian domains were expanded with further conquest throughout the 12th and 13th centuries.⁴ Other incarnations of *fuero* existed both before the Muslim conquest – notably, the 7th-century *Fuero Juzgo* – and continue to play a role in the modern Spanish legal system – most obviously in the form of Navarrese regional autonomy (Spanish: *La Comunidad Foral de Navarra*).⁵ However, I will focus solely on those *fueros* written for settlements in the immediate aftermath of their capture

¹ Frederick Jackson Turner, 'The significance of the frontier in American history', *American Historical Association*, (1893).

² Robert I. Burns, 'The significance of the frontier in the middle ages', in Robert Bartlett and Angus MacKay (eds.), *Medieval Frontier Societies* (Oxford, 1992), p. 315; Pascal Buresi, 'The appearance of the frontier concept in the Iberian Peninsula: at the crossroads of local, national and pontifical strategies (11th-13th centuries)', *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae*, 16 (2011), p. 86.

³ Jonathan Ray, 'The Jew in the text: what Christian charters tell us about medieval Jewish society', *Medieval Encounters*, 16 (2010), p. 254; Jerry R. Craddock, 'On old Spanish municipal charters as primary sources for linguistic history', *Romance Philology*, 24(1) (1970), p. 119.

⁴ See Appendices A and B in James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284* (Berkeley, 1988). Excluding Portuguese *foros* (pp. 215-8), Powers identifies three major related groups of *fueros*: the Cuenca-Teruel, Coria Cima-Coa and Toledo "formularies" (see pp. 219-29).

⁵ For the *Fuero Juzgo*, see Samuel P. Scott (ed. and trans.), *The Visigothic code (Forum judicum)* (Boston, 1910).

by Christian forces during the *Reconquista*, replacing Muslim rule under the Almohads.

Among the entire corpus of *fueros*, the *Fuero de Cuenca* stands out as the most extraordinary. Indeed, this text is widely considered one of the most illuminating examples of written municipal law anywhere in Europe during the medieval period, as well as perhaps the most significant legal document of the Central Middle Ages in Iberia.⁶ This is largely due to its unprecedented length and detail, but also because of its subsequent use as a template for the *fueros* of many other Iberian settlements both close to Cuenca and further afield.⁷

The town of Cuenca was equally conspicuous for its political significance in the eyes of the Castilian kings. It was captured after a protracted siege of eight months, led by Alfonso VIII of Castile with the timely assistance of Aragonese forces under their respective monarch, Alfonso II. Situated on Castile's borders with both Almohad lands to the south and the powerful Kingdom of Aragon to the east at the time of the *Fuero's* publication in 1190, Cuenca was seen as a particularly strategic outpost, not only for the defence of Castilian lands from external threats but also for future offensives towards the Mediterranean.⁸

And yet the Castilian monarchy could do little to determine whether Cuenca would sink or swim in what remained a fragile region. In the decades following its capture by Castilian forces in the late-1170s, the town was exposed to a sustained period of offensive raiding by the Almohads for more than two years after the major Castilian defeat at Alarcos in 1195. This was part of a much longer guerrilla campaign by Muslim forces around the Tagus river area between 1171 and 1211.⁹ Despite its military significance, the king was unable to devote enough time and resources

to personally protecting the town. Rather, that responsibility primarily fell on local protagonists.

Crown and Town

It is essential to note that the Iberian monarchies remained far from firmly established at this time.¹⁰ Their role was thus important but by no means the most important on the frontier. The Castilian monarch's authority was respected but not revered in Cuenca, where most citizens had, until recently, lived under the Muslim rulers of Al-Andalus.¹¹

The Cuencan municipal council, or *concejo*, was composed of elected leaders who governed day-to-day life in the town. The *iudex* was essentially the mayor, or highest-ranking civil official, of Cuenca, while the *alcaldes* were parish officials.¹² Interestingly, the Spanish word *alcalde*, which is still used widely today, is an Islamic legacy itself while the Jewish community in Cuenca elected their own *alcaldes* and *iudex*-equivalent official, called the *albedí* – another title derived from Arabic.¹³ These officials were the highest legal authorities in the town. Although the king was permitted two official representatives in the town, the *Señor* and the *merino*, their activities were strictly limited in the *Fuero* to their roles as the king's ambassador and his rent-collector, respectively.¹⁴

Certainly, the council was not clearly subordinate to the king. Even if the latter were physically present in Cuenca, it is unclear whether or not he would have assumed jurisdiction over and above the elected council leaders, the most senior of whom was the *iudex*:

“*The iudex should receive forty menkales [equivalent to approximately ten aurei] as remuneration for the service that he gives*

⁶ See James F. Powers, ‘Introduction’, in his own English translation of *The Code of Cuenca* (Philadelphia, 2000), p. 23.

⁷ For a full list of the towns that adopted Cuenca-type *fueros*, see Powers, *Society Organized for War (SOFW)*, pp. 227-8, in which the author describes the proliferation of the Cuencan *fuero* according to three geographical town groupings in New Castile, La Mancha, and upper Andalusia.

⁸ James F. Powers, ‘The early reconquest episcopate at Cuenca, 1177-1284’, *The Catholic Historical Review*, 87(1) (2001), pp. 2-5.

⁹ Powers, ‘Introduction’, p. 13; Powers, *SOFW*, pp. 51-2; González Jiménez, ‘Frontier and settlement’, p. 60.

¹⁰ Powers, ‘Introduction’, p. 2; Powers, *SOFW*, p. 223.

¹¹ Powers, ‘The early reconquest episcopate’, p. 2.

¹² Powers, ‘Introduction’, p. 5.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 5-6, 13.

¹⁴ *Code of Cuenca*, (Glossary) p. 231.

to the council, and the council should pay them to him; he should receive also the seventh part of the fifth [of war booty] and of those things that the council delivers voluntarily to the king or to the Señor [king's representative] of the town. It is said "voluntarily", because the Council of Cuenca does not ever have the obligation to give anything by the code or by right to the king, to the Señor of the town, or to any other, since I have made it free of all submission to the king and to the Señor of the town, of all tax, rent and fazendera [public works tax].¹⁵

Therefore, the relationship between council and king was based on voluntary obligation, rather than prescriptive hierarchy. Whereas one would expect the council to have had to take an oath of loyalty to the king upon assuming office, council members were instructed only to swear loyalty to their own municipal institutions.¹⁶ The article specifying the oath-taking requirement appears to only insert obligation to the king as an after-thought: council members had to swear loyalty to the council in its entirety, "without violating the king's honour".¹⁷

Any official found to have gained office by influence of the king or his representatives was to be barred from any such position for the remainder of his life.¹⁸ As such, loyalty to the king over the council was an impeachable offence. There is a clear suspicion of royal interference throughout the *Fuero de Cuenca* and, even when Alfonso X sought to re-establish royal control over

these towns from the 1250s, the councils that had received *fueros* similar to Cuenca's struggled fiercely to protect their autonomous rights.¹⁹ These legal documents were living texts ("*textos vivos*") to which royal authority could only provide an outline, but not impose their content.²⁰

Power of the Order

Investigating the etymology of the Spanish word for frontier – '*frontera*' – is valuable in identifying a second important local authority. Originally a Latin neologism, *frontera* was coined in Iberia by the military orders as a result of contact between their own properties and Islam.²¹ One knighthood, in particular, was instrumental in the district of Cuenca: namely, the Order of Santiago, which had played a key role in capturing the town initially, but which retained lasting claims of jurisdiction over the settlement's lands and citizens.²²

Political capital on a combative frontier often derived from military capability. This is partly why the Church is somewhat side-lined in the *fueros*; although, remarkably, the Bishop of Cuenca is known to have led long-term military forays into enemy territory across Valencia and Murcia in 1225.²³ Military pressure from the south and east meant that the additional assistance of knightly authorities was required to maintain security, law and order in Cuenca. As a result, the *Fuero* specifies that law-making in the town was to be "defined under the supervision of the knighthood".²⁴

¹⁴ Boyer, P., Delemotte, T. et al. (2020), 'Les déterminants de la mobilisation des Gilets jaunes', *Revue économique*, Vol. 71, No. 1, p. 110.

¹⁵ Aulich, J. (2020) 'Conclusion: Reflections on Protest and Political Transformation since 1789' in McGary, A., Erhart, I., et al, *The Aesthetics of Global Protest. Visual Culture and Communication*, Amsterdam University Press, p. 274.

¹⁶ Boyer et al., 'Les déterminants de la mobilisation des Gilets jaunes', p.110.

¹⁷ Boyer et al., 'Les déterminants de la mobilisation des Gilets jaunes', p.111.

¹⁸ Tôn, E. (2020), 'Gilets jaunes : «Je n'ai jamais vu autant de blessés graves»', *L'Express*, 19 January 2019 [Online]. Accessed at: https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/gilets-jaunes-je-n-ai-jamais-vu-autant-de-blesses-graves_2058008.html [Accessed 25 December 2020].

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Tonnelier, A. (2020), 'Avec la politique économique de Macron, « les 5 % de Français les plus pauvres devraient voir leur niveau de vie se réduire »', *Le Monde*, 05 February 2020 [Online]. Accessed at: https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2020/02/05/la-politique-economique-d-emmanuel-macron-profite-d-abord-aux-actifs-et-aux-plus-aises_6028477_3234.html [accessed 24 December 2020].

²¹ Ibid.

²² Gouvernement Français (2020), *Le plan Vigipirate*, Accessed at: <https://www.gouvernement.fr/vigipirate> [accessed 26 December 2020].

²³ Powers, SOFW, pp. 58-9.

²⁴ *Code of Cuenca*, p. 28; *Forum Conche*, p. 15. (Latin: "sub equitatis examine liceat deffiniri").

Although it is left unclear exactly what “supervision” involved, a passage from the Order of Santiago’s own founding charter provides a clue:

*“If, God willing and with the master present, they [the knights] acquire any personal property or a town or a castle in the land of the Saracens, after reimbursement has been made for horses and arms lost there, let a fifth part and the lordship of the town or castle be given to the master.”*²⁵

Based on this evidence, written five years before the *Fuero de Cuenca*, “supervision” might have even equated to a form of “lordship” over the town. Whether such lordship meant that the knights ruled the town over and above the king and the council is open to debate, but it is undeniable that the Order would have held a high degree of influence in determining the new legal order of Cuenca following its capture.

Crucially, the knights of this Order were permitted to be especially ambitious in their pursuit of personal conquest. They were awarded the right “to preserve faithfully the property that they now have or which, in the future, they gain or will have gained for the profit of their brothers and the growth of their house”.²⁶ Such a grant would have likely encouraged the knights to be especially competitive in fighting for and protecting land; even more so given that the property and tax revenues they acquired as a result constituted hereditary property, which would ensure the future prosperity not only of their Order, but also of their own families. Thus, as González Jiménez notes, war became an essential element of the frontier economy, at a time when jurisdictional competition between all the major Castilian powers equated to opportunistic competition for resources due to severe economic stress.²⁷ This would have engendered great desire among the knights for personal and collective aggrandizement, particularly in towns like Cuenca.

The Martial Council

Perhaps the most extraordinary legal phenomenon in Cuenca is how the role of the council changed with the presence of the knightly orders on the frontier. To survive and rule in such a volatile region, the Cuencan council could not simply function as an administrative system. Instead, it also came to function as a military unit in much the same way as the Order of Santiago.

In many ways, the two institutions converged in the frontier environment to become one and the same. Evidence of this can be found in the resemblance between the service exemption granted to the council of Cuenca (see earlier section) and the exemptions granted to the military orders by the Iberian kings. The best example of the latter is in the legal freedoms – also called *fuero* – given to the Confraternity of Belchite, an Aragonese knightly order, of which a similar version would have also applied to the Order of Santiago:

*“Nevertheless, over this army and these knights of Christ, I [King Alfonso VII of León-Castile] make myself in God’s name the principal brother and protector; below me, I establish and confirm there as chief and rector Lupo Sancho, so that he may govern and protect and lead that army of God and those knights of Christ, and so that they, who are about to serve me above and beyond [other] Christians, themselves remain exempt from a service obligation to me.”*²⁸

Comparing this excerpt with the autonomous rights granted to the council, it seems that article 12 of Chapter XVI of the *Fuero de Cuenca* may have even been modelled upon the freedoms conceded to the military orders, given the striking linguistic parallels in the law. It is likely that the council needed legal freedoms similar to those granted to the knightly orders in order to simply survive as a

²⁵ ‘The Brothers of Avila and the Order of Santiago (1172)’, James W. Brodman (trans.), in Olivia R. Constable (ed.), *Medieval Iberia: Readings from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources* (2nd ed.) (Philadelphia, 2012), p. 207.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ González Jiménez, ‘Frontier and settlement’, p. 55; Powers, ‘The early reconquest episcopate’, pp. 7-14.

²⁸ ‘Privilege to the Confraternity of Belchite (1136)’, James W. Brodman (trans.), in Constable, *Medieval Iberia*, p. 204.

legitimate institution in such hostile surroundings.

In the end, the council exploited its autonomy to thrive both militarily and economically on the frontier. Council leaders frequently embarked on independent military expeditions and not solely to join up with royal forces in capturing Seville in 1248, for example.²⁹ The *Fuero de Cuenca* provides extensive measures as to how the town should continue to function while the council led these ventures, proving that they were far from uncommon. In fact, eighty-five articles of law concern ‘*The Government of the Military Expedition*’ and ‘*The Emergency Military Muster*’.³⁰

Both municipal leaders and regular citizens, none of whom were soldiers in any formal sense, were converted into military men by the law. As such, high-risk frontier conditions forced towns like Cuenca to become what were, legally-speaking, military units akin to the military orders, both institutions being exempt from service obligation to royal authority. In this era of advancement of the unstable frontier, there was thus undoubtedly a close relationship between the knighthoods and the frontier municipalities.³¹

The *Fuero de Cuenca* is a fascinating example of how legal innovation manifests itself in frontier environments. The Castilian social contract had to be completely reimagined in response to continuous conflict and, as a result, it was the Order of Santiago and the local council, above all other authorities, whose influence came to dominate the new *status quo*. These institutions, militarily adapted to the frontier, arguably mattered even more so to the kingdom’s successful continuity than the king himself. Scholars should continue to investigate historical frontiers as the origins of such whacky cultural developments, just as Turner advocated back in 1893.



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²⁹ Powers, SOFW, p. 61.

³⁰ Code of Cuenca, (Ch. XXX-XXXI) pp. 165-80.

³¹ Powers, SOFW, p. 66.

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A Bipolar World: The Poisoning of Sergei Skripal and Anglo-Russian Relations

The Cold War was a bitter ideological and military rivalry which dominated the international system for the latter half of the twentieth century. Both the Soviet Union and the West competed to shape international politics; with communism and capitalism pitted against one another. The Cold War possessed an element of inevitability, a necessary conflict between the East and West, which encompassed other countries, requiring them to choose a side. Today, throughout the media, and even official government statements, the narrative of a ‘New’ or ‘Second’ Cold War is emerging, comparing present day tensions to this rivalry of the late twentieth century.¹ This is a mutual rhetoric, with the Russians also labelling the current conflict through analogy with the Cold war. In 2016, the Prime Minister of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev stated, “we have slid into a new period of Cold War”, adding, “sometimes I wonder if it’s 2016, or if we live in 1962”.² Later, in response to the Skripal poisonings of March 2018, the British Russian Embassy tweeted an image of a thermometer captioned, “The temperature of Anglo-Russian relations drops to -23 °C, but we are not afraid of cold weather”.³ Anglo-Russian relations are in a state of extreme

deterioration due to various events over the past few years including the Georgia-Russia War, the Ukrainian Crisis, and Russia’s disruption of Western democracy. However the poisoning of Sergei Skripal, former Russian military agent and double agent for the British intelligence agencies in 2018, incited an escalation of ‘Cold War 2.0’ narratives. The British press ran headlines such as, “Britain is braced for Cold War II” and, “The Makings of a New Cold War”, while the official government response was to take immediate action.⁴ Furthermore, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Tom Tugendhat, argued that Moscow was conducting, “a form of soft war against the West”. Events of the past few years do echo the bipolar relationship of the Cold War, exposing Russia’s expansionist ambitions and determination to destroy the liberal international order, yet it is not directly comparable.⁵ Making such comparisons suggests, “not only a tremendous threat, but also an overarching struggle”, with the world divided between two camps in a geopolitical and ideological confrontation.⁶ The scale of the current confrontation certainly does not match that of the Cold War, nor is it a matter of two belief systems pitched

¹ Salisbury Poisoning a ‘war crime by Russia’, *The World Tonight*, 5 July, 2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b0b85m-fm> [Accessed 12/01/2021]; G. Evans, ‘Cold War: How do Russia tensions compare to Soviet era?’, *BBC News*, 26 March, 2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43546340> [Accessed 13/01/2021], See *Daily Mirror Newspaper*, Thursday March 15, 2018.

² ‘World has slipped into a ‘new Cold War’: Russian PM, *Al Jazeera*, February 13, 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/2/13/world-has-slipped-into-a-new-cold-war-russian-pm> [Accessed 12/01/2021].

³ See Figure One: Russian Embassy, UK Tweet showcasing the Second Cold War, 14 March, 2018, *Twitter*, <https://twitter.com/russianembassy/status/973993379024556032?lang=en> [Accessed 24/03/2021].

⁴ ‘Britain is braced for Cold War II’, *The Times*, 16 March, 2018; ‘Russia v the West: Vladimir Putin’s new cold war’, *The Irish Times*, 29 December, 2018 <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/russia-v-the-west-vladimir-putin-s-new-cold-war-1.3731720> [Accessed 24/03/2021].

⁵ A. Lieven, ‘The Dance of the Ghosts: A New Cold War with Russia Will Not Serve Western Interests’, *Survival*, Vol. 60, Issue 5, (2018), p. 118.

⁶ *Ibid* p. 117.

against one another.⁷ Regardless of the complexities of labelling the current confrontation a ‘New’ or ‘Second’ Cold War, it is undeniable that the current relationship is fraught with tension. The question that remains is whether the use of this analogy reflects a return to a bipolar world order or, at least if not in reality, a shared *mentality* of a bipolar world from the British perspective.



Figure 1: Russian Embassy, UK Tweet showcasing the Second Cold War

Academic Perspective

The answer to this question can be summarised rather succinctly according to Legvold – “the world is no longer bipolar”.⁸ If we are to believe Legvold then a fuller consideration of today’s world order is due. From an academic perspective the conclusions drawn regarding the current international order vary to some degree. These include multi-polar, uni-multipolar, non-polar, but almost never

bipolar.⁹ Supporting evidence often cites a lack of ideological underpinnings, the disproportionate military and economic capacities of either side and, most markedly, the quantity of competing contemporary threats to the West – of which Russia is by no means the greatest. Whilst affirming that the current international system is not bipolar, academics have extended this, and suggested that the world has not reflected a bipolar model since the cessation of the Cold War. In fact, some historians, most notably Odd Arne Westad, have also looked back to the Cold War and posited a different model than bipolarity.¹⁰ Various theories regarding the emerging international system include one of a ‘New World Order’, a ‘Multipolar World’ or a ‘Unipolar World’.¹¹ Those supporting a ‘New World Order’ believed power would not dictate international relations, the role of the state would cease, and international organisations and economic entities would dominate. Such a neo-idealist mentality is often referred to as ‘neo-Wilsonian’ or ‘neo-liberalism’.¹² Although NATO is a crucial player in Anglo-Russian relations, this clearly does not represent today’s reality. Alternatively, a more pessimistic view that has been prominent is the ‘Multipolar World’. This label aptly sums up its own argument of an increasing number of poles, and the rise of Japan and the EU are often cited as evidence in support of this theory.¹³ This is closer to the present-day international order in which power is distributed across the globe. While economic and military power may be widely dispersed, this does not mean that Britain’s blinkered outlook has expanded to appreciate them as equal to the threat of Russia. Finally, the concept of a ‘Unipolar World’ stresses the replacement of bipolarity with hegemony – specifically, the hegemony of America. Sometimes, this view has been encapsulated in sentiments such as Pax Americana

⁷ R. Legvold, ‘Managing the New Cold War. What Moscow and Washington Can Learn from the Last One’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93, Issue 4, (2014), p. 74.

⁸ *Ibid* p. 75.

⁹ L. Gaiser and I. Kovač, ‘From Bipolarity to Bipolarity: International Relations Repeating Again’, *J Glob Policy Gov*, (2012), pp. 49-50.

¹⁰ See, O. A. Westad, *The Cold War: A World History*, London (2018).

¹¹ *Ibid*.

¹² See J. M. Grieco, *Cooperation among nations: Europe, America, and non-tariff barriers to trade*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (1990) and J. Nye, ‘Neorealism and neoliberalism’, *World Politics*, 1988, pp. 235–25.

¹³ See J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the future: instability in Europe after the cold war’, *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1., (1990) pp. 5–56.

or American Hegemony.¹⁴ As a reflection of the present-day international order, a number of academics have observed a shift from unipolarity to non-polarity. Richard Haas observes, “the principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be non-polarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power”.¹⁵ Although the replacement of the Cold War international system seems to be up for discussion, the end of a bipolar world is irrefutable in academic circles.¹⁶ It appears to be concrete in the minds of academics that bipolarity is a phenomenon of the past. This is not just an academic perspective, but a true reflection of the contemporary international system. The West is plagued by a number of threats, Islamist fundamentalism in particular. This alone further renders bipolarity an inaccurate assessment of international relations, not simply because alternative threats can be observed, but also that Russia has aligned itself with the West in the struggle against Islamist terrorism and extremism.¹⁷ How can a bipolar relationship exist between Russia and the West when they are fighting a mutual threat? Furthermore, Russia does not possess the economic nor military strength that Soviet Russia once did. Its nuclear capacity is balanced by the American, British, and French capacity to destroy Russia, and even the strength of its army has been sneered at.¹⁸ In the Defence Intelligence Agency Report on Russia’s Military Power in 2017, Russia’s military threat was surmised in a patronising statement: “It is a military that can intervene in countries along Russia’s periphery, or as far away as the Middle East.”¹⁹ Such clear limitations of the

Russian military, together with an economy one tenth the size of the European Union and American economies combined, makes the current conflict an unfair match to say the least.²⁰ Given the diminished state of Russia as an international force, it is indisputable that suggestions of a ‘New’ or ‘Second’ Cold War are inaccurate and misplaced. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan said, “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not of his own facts”, and by this logic, the world is no longer bipolar.²¹

Popular Perspective

Meanwhile, the more popular perception of the international order amongst Britons lends itself to a more simplistic view than scholars would like; favouring a narrative of continued bipolarity between Russia and the West. News outlets have contributed to this narrative considerably. Articles at the time of the Skripal poisonings were headed with titles such as, ‘Cold War Two’, branding the content with an overt link to bipolarity.²² The British tabloid *The Daily Mirror* led this charge with, “Cold War II: Putin vows revenge as PM kicks out 23 Russian spooks in poison storm”, followed with, “Britain is braced for Cold War II after Prime Minister Theresa May expelled 23 Russian spies.”²³ The *Daily Mirror* was not alone, nor was this front-page branding confined to the tabloids. Broadsheets soon joined; *The Times* stated, “West unites to confront Russia over poisonings” alongside a photograph of President John F Kennedy, who led the US during perhaps the most dramatic phase of the actual Cold War.²⁴ In addition, *The World Tonight* on BBC Sounds declared the incident a, “war crime by Russia.”²⁵ Although academics are increasingly visible in news

¹⁴ See J. Muravchik, ‘At last, Pax Americana’, *The New York Times*, January 24, 1991, Section A, p. 23 and C. Layne, B. Schwarz, ‘American hegemony: without an enemy’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 93, (1993), pp. 5-23.

¹⁵ R. N. Haass, ‘The age of non-polarity, what will follow US dominance?’, *Foreign Affairs*, 2008.

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63397/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity> [Accessed 12/01/2021].

¹⁶ L. Gaiser and I. Kovač, ‘From Bipolarity to Bipolarity’.

¹⁷ A. Lieven, ‘Dance of the Ghosts’, p. 124.

¹⁸ *Ibid* p. 115.

¹⁹ United States, Defence Intelligence Agency, *Russia Military Power*, (2017), p. 13.

²⁰ Gross Domestic Product, World Bank, 2019 <https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf> [Accessed 12/01/2021]

²¹ As referenced in A. Lieven, ‘Against Russophobia’, *World Policy Journal*, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1 January, 2001, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2001/01/01/against-russophobia-pub-626> [Accessed 24/03/2021].

²² See *Daily Mirror*, Thursday March 15, 2018.

²³ *Ibid*.

²⁴ See *The Times*, 16 March, 2018.

²⁵ ‘Salisbury Poisoning a ‘war crime by Russia’, *The World Tonight*, 5 July, 2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b0b85mf> [Accessed 12/01/2021].

articles, such as ‘Russia v the West: Is this a new Cold War’, alarmist slogans and brandings of bipolarity dominated the front-page and people’s minds.²⁶ These fear-mongering statements were not confined to the often sensationalist media, but were also used in official government and intelligence organisation speeches. Giving a public speech at the University of St. Andrews, Alex Younger - the head of MI6 - differentiated between Russian and British values and methods, creating a distinct separation: “We will do this in our way, according to our laws, and our values”.²⁷ The distinct repetition of ‘our’ insinuates that ‘their’ way is of course different and opposite to the ‘British way’, and therefore a narrative of bipolarity is established. Furthermore, Jeremy Fleming, the head of GCHQ, declared, “they work in a parallel universe where the normal rules of international affairs are inverted”.²⁸ Although the poisoning of the Skripals brought good reason for the British government and authorities to publicly chastise Russia, the narrative of bipolarity is overwhelming, and signifies a continuation of a Cold War mentality. The narrative of bipolarity is not just one which dominated politics from the top-down. It can also be found in many variations of popular culture, such as films and even computer games. Popular culture played a significant part in the perpetuation and justification of Cold War mentalities at the time of the conflict. According to Paul Bleton, spy fiction was a central instrument in anchoring and perpetuating the Cold War mentality in popular culture, as it spread a political message through dramatized entertainment.²⁹ During the course of the Cold War, authors like John le Carré, or titles like the James Bond series, reinforced the

ideological polarity through the depiction of the Russians as the ‘bad guys’ while the British were inevitably the ‘good guys’.³⁰ Furthermore, Christoph Classen shows how film and television played perhaps an even greater role in creating Cold War mentalities.³¹ Through the pretended realism, audiences were drawn into the excitement of an attention-grabbing plot and could visualise the enemy. This continues today. For instance, *The Game* (2014) features Odin, the stereotypical Russian villain; a cold, merciless character, whom even the Soviets are known to fear.³² The British character, Joe spends the series tracking down his adversary and seeking revenge for Odin murdering his love Yulia. The clarity and certainty embodied in the characters of Joe and Odin reinforces the binary of good versus bad, of which Britons can place themselves on the good side. The computer game *Call of Duty* is also evident of this Cold War mentality continuing to permeate popular culture.³³ *Call of Duty* has been criticised for promoting ‘anti-Russian propaganda’ in a scenario called ‘Highway of Death’.³⁴ In this scenario, the player, embedded as a CIA operative overlooking a Middle Eastern desert, is told how, “The Russians bombed it... killing the people trying to escape”.³⁵ This resembles an incident from the 1990-2 Gulf War, also called the ‘Highway of Death’, when America and its allies attacked a retreating Iraqi convoy on Highway 80, resulting in mass casualties and later accusations against the American military for undue force. To blame Russia, rather than America, in the context of this game attaches moral baggage to the East-West divide which renders Russia the ‘bad guys’ regardless of the facts. *Call of Duty* is not the only example of contemporary culture

²⁶ J. Marcus, ‘Russia v the West: Is this a new Cold War?’, *BBC News*, 1 April, 2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43581449> [Accessed 13/01/2021].

²⁷ ‘MI6 Boss on Novichok Poisoning’, *BBC News*, 3 December, 2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-46429651> [Accessed 12/01/2021].

²⁸ ‘Salisbury Novichok poisoning: Threat from Russia is ‘real’ – GCHQ’, *BBC News*, 7 September, 2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-45444080> [Accessed 12/01/2021].

²⁹ P. Bleton, ‘Machiavelli’s Angels Hiding in Plain Sight: Media Culture and French Spy Fiction of the Cold War’ in Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges (eds.), *The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation*, pp. 134-151.

³⁰ K. H. Jarausch, C. F. Ostermann, A. Etges (eds.), *The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation*, p. 10.

³¹ Classen, ‘Enemies, Spies, and the Bomb’ in K. H. Jarausch, C. F. Ostermann, A. Etges (eds.), *The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation*, pp. 152-176.

³² *The Game*, Written by M. B. Akil, S. Akil, S. V. Finney, K. Barris, BBC, November 2014.

³³ *Call of Duty: Modern Warfare* [Computer Game], 2019, Infinity Ward.

³⁴ J. Wills, ‘Is Call of Duty really promoting anti-Russian propaganda?’, *The Conversation*, November 8, 2016, <https://theconversation.com/is-call-of-duty-really-promoting-anti-russian-propaganda-126459> [Accessed 12/01/2021].

³⁵ *Ibid.*

which furthers the polarisation between Russia and the West, attempting to recreate the fear, or at least suspicion, of Russian adversaries. The trope of the British hero, versus the Russian ‘baddie’ is almost universal in the entertainment industry. Some examples include *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, the film (2011), *The Game*, TV series (2014), and *McMafia*, TV series (2018).³⁶ Despite the reality of a world inundated with threats, popular culture remains fixated on the enemy from the East in a narrative of bipolarity and ‘othering’. Though there are clearly other major threats vying for British attention, the British psyche remains preoccupied with the Russian enemy. Therefore, something more significant than the evidence and facts must be at play in the minds of Britons. Schlesinger talks of a ‘conception’ of one’s past.³⁷ One of the points which he grapples with is that historical truth is not an active agent in our understanding of the past, instead we have a ‘conception’, and a mythologised form. In the context of the Skripal poisonings, I would purport that this could be extended to include the present day too. Truth does not appear to be an important aspect in our understanding of the world today. Instead, the past, and our conception of it, provides the framework for our understanding. Thus, as of Call of Duty demonstrated, reality possesses little pertinence. Instead, Russia was villainised for a crime they had not committed. Bipolarity provides a framework for Britons to make sense of the world, yet this means Russia often becomes the victim of a ‘blame game’.³⁸ This is because the power of historical truth has a difficult time competing with the power of the right story at the right time even though, or perhaps precisely because, the latter has been adulterated by myth and legend. Both the academic and popular view, as well as an appreciation of memory’s role in Briton’s perception

of a bipolar world, can perhaps be reconciled through an understanding of ‘Enemy Deprivation Syndrome’ - a theory initially asserted by Lyle Goldstein.³⁹ It has been observed by academics of many disciplines that as a society we have a psychological need for an enemy. In the words of Finlay, Holsti and Fagen, “It seems that we have always needed enemies and scapegoats; if they have not been readily available, we have created them”.⁴⁰ Goldstein furthers this, and attests that many in the West seem, “to have succumbed to ‘enemy deprivation syndrome’ after the Cold War”, as a number of national security specialists seem to yearn for a, “simple threat that is easily characterised”.⁴¹ In short, although the world is not bipolar, is it perceived as such, because ironically, Russia is considered a *safe* enemy. Threats and concerns now exist throughout the globe, including Iran, North Korea, as well as ISIS and other forms of radical Islamist extremism. Looking back to the Cold War, a time when conflict was restricted to East v West, provides comfort and security as there was a clear understanding of the threat. It also reassures the West that the world has not really changed, and therefore neither should their policies. Historian Max Hastings observed this before the Skripal poisonings, in 2015: ‘we’re still coming to terms with the problem of non-state enemies... In the old days we knew who the enemy was’.⁴² Furthermore, Whithouse, director of *The Game*, comments that a nostalgia originates from remembering when, “the bogey man wasn’t the suicide bomber or the EDL [English Defence League] thug, but glamorous and ruthless Russian spies”.⁴³ Such a remark comes close to handing some respect to the ‘old enemy’, as the words ‘glamorous and ruthless’, in juxtaposition with ‘suicide bomber’ and ‘thug’, credit the Soviet enemy with an air of sophistication when compared to modern threats and extremists. Forgetting

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, 2011, Tomas Alfredson; *The Game*, Written by M. B. Akil, S. Akil, S. V. Finney, K. Barris, BBC, November 2014; *McMafia*, Directed by James Watkins, Written by James Watkins and Amini Hossein, BBC, 2018.

³⁷ A. Schlesinger Jr., ‘Folly’s Antidote’, *New York Times*, 1 January 2007 <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/opinion/01schlesinger.html> [Accessed 24/03/2021].

³⁸ D. Basulto, *Russophobia: How Western Media Turns Russia Into the Enemy*, The Druzhba Project, (2015), p. 21.

³⁹ As quoted in J. Marcus, ‘Russia v the West: Is this a new Cold War?’, *BBC News*, 1 April, 2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43581449> [Accessed 13/01/2021].

⁴⁰ D. J. Finlay, O. R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, *Enemies in politics*, (Chicago, 1967), p. 7.

⁴¹ As quoted in J. Marcus, ‘Russia v the West: Is this a new Cold War?’

⁴² M. Hastings, Comment on *Question Time*, 19 November 2015.

⁴³ ‘The Game Press Pack’, BBC, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/mediapacks/the-game> [Accessed 13/01/2020], pp. 4-5.

is as crucial a part of memory as remembering.⁴⁴ By depicting Russia as the prime enemy of Britain and extending the narrative of the Cold War into contemporary conflicts, Britain, and the West, are once again creating a 'simple' threat out of Russia and ignoring the complexities that the Cold War brought in reality. Through this misremembered version of the past, a form of escapism is sought from the turbulent present. As the present reality is one of, "YouTube beheadings and drone warfare", the Cold War has been fashioned to appear quaint in comparison.⁴⁵ This serves as an explanation for the animosity, and prevalence of 'Cold War 2.0' statements in the media, government statements, and culture, despite the reality of Western interests.

A New Phenomenon?

The question that remains, is whether Britons have continued to frame conflict with Russia in terms of bipolarity ever since the end of the Cold War, or whether it is a newer phenomenon. This can be observed most clearly in a comparison between the British response to the Litvinenko poisoning in 2006, and the Skripal poisoning in 2018. Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned drinking a cup of tea, laced with the radioactive metalloid Polonium-210 in the Pine Bar of London's Millennium Hotel. Litvinenko, unlike Skripal, died three weeks later as a result of the poisoning. On his deathbed, he was adamant that, "the world know that he has been poisoned by the Kremlin", yet the British response served little in the way of retribution.⁴⁶ The failed extradition of Andrei Lugovoy in 2007, and the delayed execution of the Litvinenko Enquiry (2016) did little to address the scope of the crime and deter its repetition. Then, in 2018, with the attempted poisoning of Skripal in Salisbury, Britain responded by expelling twenty-three Russian diplomats. Following this, British allies, including America, most EU member states, Australia, Canada,

as well as NATO, co-ordinated an expulsion of over 100 Russian accredited diplomats.⁴⁷ This was a much bigger display of retribution, but also a display of the collective power and support behind Britain. A further differentiation can also be observed in the media rhetoric surrounding the two incidents – not just in the state-level response. As previously discussed, the rhetoric dominating the media response to the Skripal poisoning was one of a 'Second' or 'New' Cold War beginning with Russia. However, at the time of the Litvinenko poisoning, headlines did not reflect the same rhetoric, instead they summarised the events: 'Poisoned former KGB man dies in hospital', for example, from the Guardian.⁴⁸ Through this comparison of the British response to the Litvinenko and Skripal poisonings, it is clear that the mentality of Britons towards Russia had shifted in the interim period. In 2006, there was a muted response, and significantly less evidence that would suggest a common perception of the world as bipolar. By 2018, however, a Cold War mentality had been recreated to frame the conflict with Russia. The phrase 'New' or 'Second' Cold War, used in 2018, implies that there was an end to the first Cold War, thereby suggesting Britons' binary perception of their relationship with Russia was based on some newfound reason. Between 2006 and 2018, Anglo-Russian relations had worsened; Putin had solidified his authoritarian power and had begun to pursue a more assertive foreign policy – clearly demonstrated through the Ukrainian Crisis. While continuity can be observed, the ensuing crisis between Russia and Britain reinvigorated Cold War memory and birthed the narrative of a 'New' or 'Second' Cold War.



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⁴⁴ L. Noakes, Juliette Pattinson, *British Cultural Memory. and the Second World War*, London, (2014).

⁴⁵ M. McNamara, 'Cold-War Thriller "The Game" at the Top of Its Spy Game', *LA Times*, 5 November 2014, <http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/tv/la-et-st-bbc-the-game-review-20141105-column.html> [Accessed 13/01/2021].

⁴⁶ R. Owen, *The Litvinenko Enquiry: Report into the death of Alexander Litvinenko*, HC 695, 2016, p. 42.

⁴⁷ J. Borger, P. Wintour, H. Stewart, 'Western allies expel scores of Russian diplomats over Skripal attack', *The Guardian*, 27 March 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/26/four-eu-states-set-to-expel-russian-diplomats-over-skripal-attack> [Accessed 13/01/2021].

⁴⁸ I. Cobain, J. Vasagar, L. Glendinning, 'Poisoned former KGB man dies in hospital', *The Guardian*, 24 November 2006, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/nov/24/russia.world> [Accessed 13/01/2021].

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Corporate Complicity in Crimes Against Humanity: The Role of Ford Motor Company in the Argentine Disappearances (1976 -1983)

On 24 March 1976, the military seized power in Argentina as part of what they referred to as their 'calling' to restore law and order to a chaotic country. This violent coup began a dark period of state-sponsored torture and terrorism. The military's objective, to oppose any sector of life which could be viewed as a threat to their dictatorship, was officially known as the 'Proseco', but dubbed the 'dirty war' (1976-1983) by the public. Whatever its name, the facts are that between 1976 and 1983, an estimated 30,000 Argentines, including women and children, were 'disappeared', kidnapped and tortured. Since 1983, historians have increasingly drifted from laying exclusive culpability of the dictatorship's atrocities at the Argentine military's door, towards structural analyses that locate the source of the human rights abuses within broader economic, political and social conditions prevailing in Argentina before 1976. Indeed, as Verbitsky and Bohoslavsky make clear in their recent, ground-breaking text, the term 'military dictatorship' has now been abandoned, in favour of 'other more complex terms that more

closely reflect the reality of a bloc that was formed by civilian, military, business and church elements'.¹

Through an examination of the Ford Motor Company, this study focuses on the broader economic conditions and 'business' complicity that contributed towards the human rights abuses of the Argentine dictatorship (1976-1983). The Argentinian subsidiary of Ford, established in 1913 by Henry Ford had, by 1970, become an essential contributor to the Argentine economy and employed around 7,500 workers at its main plant in General Pacheco alone.² The company's active involvement in the disappearances of their own employees cannot be contested: executives and managers drew up 'black' or 'subversive' lists of unionists who had been disruptive, company vehicles were used to carry out the kidnappings and there was a clandestine detention centre on plant property.³ Moreover, after those disappeared 'failed to appear' at work, the company sent family members notices for the termination of their employment.⁴ Recent court cases reflect the international effort to hold corporations accountable for complicity in Argentine

¹ Horacio Verbitsky and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, *The Economic Accomplices to the Argentine Dictatorship Outstanding Debts* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 2.

² Mira Wilkins and Frank Hill, *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents* (Wayne State University Press, 1964), pp. 56-57; Olivia Abrecht, 'US Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Abuses Abroad: A Case Study of Ford Motor Company in Argentina', *Carolina Digital Repository* (2015), p. 7.

³ Ian Steinman, 'When Ford built a torture chamber', *Jacobin*, 23 February 2018, found at <https://jacobinmag.com/2018/02/ford-factory-argentina-videla-mauricio-macri> [Accessed 01/01/21].

⁴ *Ibid.*

human rights during the military dictatorship. In 2018, Pedro Muller (the former head of manufacturing at Ford), Hector Sibilla (the former head of Ford's plant security) and Santiago Riveros (the former head of the Military Institutes of the Army), were convicted and sentenced to 10, 12 and 15 years in prison respectively.⁵

Speaking in 2014, a survivor of the Ford employee kidnappings, Carlos Propato, was so certain of Ford's direct complicity that he stated the company was not an 'accomplice' to the dictatorship, but was the dictatorship.⁶ He even suggested that the Ford executives were, in fact, the 'army's bosses'.⁷ Propato's words, alongside the outcome of the court case against the Ford executives, are testament to the extent of the corporation's involvement in the disappearances. The extent of Ford's involvement is of particular interest to people across the world and the company's international reputation has generated substantial public interest in the outcome of the court cases. As Banham claims, 'no matter the language, no matter the culture, no matter the vast gulf of differences separating you, eyes will register recognition... Ford has shaped the world around us'.⁸ In the case of the Argentine disappearances, however, this ability to shape the world is not always positive.

Even before the military regime took control, Ford had openly expressed their frustrations with left-wing unionists, who were represented by one of the most pugnacious Argentine unions, the Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor (SMATA).⁹ The company had commented on the increasing pressure they were experiencing under the rise of unionist demands; demands which were

the result of tensions within the union bureaucracy. In a 1974 *Time Magazine* article, Ford drew attention to the 'besieged' business community, deeming it necessary to call to the military for assistance and intervention.¹⁰ Just before the coup in 1976, Ford executives communicated with the armed forces and were persuaded, as the labour leaders had been, by the military's plans for improving the country's economic efficiency. Convinced that a more stable Argentine economy would emerge under military power, Ford actively supported the overthrow of Isabel Peron and praised the regime's immediate objectives to weaken trade union structures and the labour movement.¹¹ On 2 January 1977, almost a year into the dictatorship, Ford reiterated this support, buying a full-page ad in the *La Nación* newspaper, stating, '1976: Once again, Argentina finds its way; 1977: New Year of faith and hope for all Argentines of good will'.¹² The corporation's support of the military's usurpation of power and their active encouragement to suppress labour rights across the country, believing that with the military in control the country had 'found its way', was just the start of Ford's involvement in the systematic attack on unionists.

Just one day after the military regime took control, union representatives at General Pacheco, Ford's main production plant, saw the beginning of what would become years of unionist repression. Internal union representatives were summoned to a meeting with the plant's management, including the director of labour relations, Guillhermo Galarraga. At this meeting they were firmly told - and explicitly warned - by Galarraga, to 'forget any union demands'.¹³

⁵ The Centre for Legal and Social Studies, 'The Ford Case: Prison Terms of 10, 12 and 15 years', 11 December 2018, found at <https://www.cels.org.ar/web/en/2018/12/causa-ford-condenas-de-10-12-y-15-anos/> (accessed 10/10/20).

⁶ Human Rights BA interviews Carlos Popato, 'Señalización Empresa 'Ford' Planta Pacheco' [Signalling the Ford Company's Pacheco Plant] Translated by Kitty Fellowes, 28 April 2014, found at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b5y6rC8nqiM> [Accessed 12/11/20].

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Russ Banham, *The Ford Century: Ford Motor Company and the Innovations that shaped the World* (New York, 2002), p. 18.

⁹ Horacio Verbitsky and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, *The Economic Accomplices to the Argentine Dictatorship Outstanding Debts* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 206.

¹⁰ 'Argentina: Trial by Terror', *Time Magazine*, 14 January 1974, found at <http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,908374,00.html> [Accessed 02/02/21].

¹¹ Willem De Haan, 'To know or not to know: Silent Complicity in Crimes against Humanity in Argentina (1976-1983)', *Business History*, 62 (2020), p. 16.

¹² *La Nación*, 2 January 1977, <https://news.google.co.uk/newspapers?nid=BZGggv0hN9sC> [Accessed 09/10/20] in Diane Taylor, *Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina's 'Dirty War'* (Durham, 1997), p. 111.

¹³ Ian Stenman, 'When Ford built a torture chamber', *Jacobin*, 23 February 2018, found at <https://jacobinmag.com/2018/02/ford-factory-argentina-videla-mauricio-macri> [Accessed 01/01/21].

The events that followed and the consequences for those who did not adhere to Galarraga's demands, are summarised by the Argentine attorney, Quintana, who represented the disappeared at the trial of Muller and Sibilla:

The majority [of disruptive unionists] were kidnapped while they were on the production line. They were taken at gunpoint and made to walk by all the other workers so they could see what happened to their union representatives¹⁴

One way that Ford's management discreetly targeted disruptive unionist employees, who they believed were making excessive demands, was by giving a list of names to the military junta who they wanted 'removed'. The unionists that the company wanted 'removing' were named, by company management, on 'subversive' or 'black' lists, which were then given to members of the armed forces. The lists were passed between the executives, the managers of the plants, and, finally, the military who would then take the named employees to clandestine detention centres. Extensive information, including personal addresses and photo ID's, was given to the armed forces through these lists.¹⁵ 'Subversive' lists were, thereby, formulated and created from calculated research by Ford executives, evidencing a clear intention in who was kidnapped. According to Da Haan, whose work focuses on silent complicity in crimes against humanity, 'undercover agents' also infiltrated the factory floor, identifying the least suspecting troublemakers

and informing those creating the 'subversive' lists.¹⁶ The use of undercover agents in the creation of target lists, further evidences the complicity of Ford in the disappearance of their employees.

Another example of Ford's direct complicity was the construction and managing of onsite, illegal, clandestine detention centres. One known example, under Ford's control, was on the grounds of the Pacheco plant, in Buenos Aires. According to the company website, the plant was established in 1962 as a 'stamping and assembly plant' and remains today as one of the oldest manufacturing sectors in the country.¹⁷ However, throughout the civil-military dictatorship, it was a scene of brutal repression and a location of systematic human rights abuses. Through Gaudin's article, we learn that Judge Vence, who headed the investigation into the Ford detention camps, 'inspected the industrial site accompanied by 10 surviving workers'.¹⁸ All these workers recognised the location as the site of their torture camps and could explain the details of its operation.¹⁹ The Pacheco detention centre was constructed on the plant's soccer fields and run by military personnel who moved about the company grounds, illegally detaining Ford employees in company branded vehicles, as evidenced by a 2002 *La Nación* article, commenting on Ford's 'ties to the army'.²⁰ The article uses the testimonies of Pedro Troiani, a survivor, and Larry Rohter, an American journalist, to comment on the Pacheco plant's 'established barracks and detention centre'.²¹ Troiani, whose disappearance will be analysed closer, describes how he was taken, 'at gunpoint', and held captive at the plants 'Sport and Recreation Centre', a place he previously attended union meetings.²²

¹⁴ Tomás Ojea Quintana cited in Ian Stenman, 'When Ford built a torture chamber', *Jacobin*, 23 February 2018, found at <https://jacobinmag.com/2018/02/ford-factory-argentina-videla-mauricio-macri> [Accessed 01/01/21].

¹⁵ Uki Goñi, 'Argentina: Two ex-Ford executives convicted in torture case', *The Guardian*, 11 December 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/11/pedro-muller-hedro-sibilla-ford-executives-argentina-torture-case> [Accessed 12/12/20].

¹⁶ Willem De Haan, 'To know or not to know: Silent Complicity in Crimes against Humanity in Argentina (1976-1983)', *Business History*, 62 (2020), p. 12.

¹⁷ 'Ford Motor Company Pacheco Assembly Plant', *Ford Authority*, 29 May 2020, found at <https://fordauthority.com/fmc/ford-motor-company-plants-facilities/ford-motor-company-argentina-plants-facilities/ford-motor-company-pacheco-assembly-plant-pacheco-argentina/> [Accessed 10/10/20].

¹⁸ Andres Gaudin, 'Former ford executives charged with crimes against humanity in Argentina', *Latin America DataBase* (2013), p. 2.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid; 'They link the Ford company with the dictatorship', *La Nación*, 28 November 2002, found at <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/vinculan-a-la-empresa-ford-con-la-dictadura-nid453541/> [Accessed 02/02/21].

²¹ Ibid.

²² Pedro Troiani cited in 'They link the Ford company with the dictatorship', *La Nación*, 28 November 2002, found at <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/vinculan-a-la-empresa-ford-con-la-dictadura-nid453541/> [Accessed 02/02/21].

Troiani survived his kidnapping and on 21 January 2012, in an effort to bring awareness to the disappeared, returned to the entrance of the Pache-co plant where he stated: ‘when they took the first compañero, we thought it was an isolated act, but after that, another and another were kidnapped.’²³

A well-documented disappearance was that of Ford employee, Adolfo Omar Sanchez, who was kidnapped from his home at 1321 Zorzal Street, Tigre, in the Province of Buenos Aires on 28 March 1976 at 9pm.²⁴ Sanchez was a Ford union delegate and had been called to a meeting with ‘Galarraga, labour relations manager, Marcos, manager of the Pressing Plant, and Luis Pérez, labour representative’, close to the time of his kidnapping.²⁵ After Galarraga stated that Ford no longer recognised the status of the delegates, Sanchez was mockingly told that ‘he was going to know about General Camps.’²⁶ That evening, around seven or eight people came to his house and, despite Sanchez defending himself by saying that he was ‘neither a member of nor active in any political party whatsoever’, he was kidnapped.²⁷ After two months of illegal imprisonment in a clandestine detention centre, he was transferred to the Villa Devoto Prison in the Federal Capital on 19 May 1976, where he was to remain until 14

January 1977.²⁸ Adolfo Omar Sanchez’s testimony is supported by that of his colleague, Juan Carlos Amoroso, Ford’s head of Human Resources, who was kidnapped the same night.²⁹ In Amoroso’s account he had also attended the meeting with Galarraga, of his own kidnapping, he mentions that the soldier taking him away was holding his photo ID card, a document that only Ford managers and administration team would have had access to, and that Marcos and Pérez.³⁰ At this meeting, he claims that Galarraga turned to him and said to ‘give [his] regards to Camps.’³¹ Whilst the name ‘Camps’ meant little to Amoroso then, he would later come to know that it referred to General Ramón Camps, the head of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police, who was responsible for the murder of 5,000 people during the dictatorship.³² In their testimonies, Sanchez and Amoroso show how the military were in possession of company photo ID cards and, alongside the comments made by Galarraga, this highlights Ford’s awareness and involvement in the targeting of unionists occurring on their property.

Pedro Troiani’s testimony contributes further to the discussion of Ford’s direct complicity in employee disappearances.³³ Troiani, who had a history of pressing managers for better working conditions,

²³ Andres Gaudin, ‘Former Ford Executives charged with Crimes against Humanity in Argentina’, *Latin America Database* (2013), p. 3.

²⁴ Testimony of Adolfo Omar Sanchez (file No. 7683) extracted from ‘CONADEP Report: Nunca Más [Never Again]: Part II. H, 20 September 1984, found at http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm [Accessed 10/10/20].

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ ‘Caso N.572: Sanchez, Adolfo Omar’ [Case N.572: Sanchez, Adolfo Omar] Translated by Kitty Fellowes, *Equipa Nikzor*, Case No. 13/84 - Derechos Human rights, 30 September 2006, found at <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/causa13/casos/caso572.html> [Accessed 04/01/2021], p. 1.

²⁷ Testimony of Adolfo Omar Sanchez (file No. 7683) extracted from ‘CONADEP Report: Nunca Más [Never Again]: Part II. H’ 20 September 1984, found at http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm [Accessed 10/10/20].

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Testimony of Juan Carlo Amoroso (file No. 1638) extracted from ‘CONADEP Report: Nunca Más [Never Again]: Part II. H’ 20 September 1984, found at http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm [Accessed 10/10/20].

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Testimony of Juan Carlos Amoroso (file No. 1638) extracted from ‘CONADEP Report: Nunca Más [Never Again]: Part II.H’ 20 September 1984, found at http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm [Accessed 10/10/20].

³² Olivia Abrecht, ‘US Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Abuses Abroad: A Case Study of Ford Motor Company in Argentina’, *Carolina Digital Repository* (2015), p. 11.

³³ Testimony of Pedro Norberto Troiani (file No. 1638) extracted from ‘CONADEP Report: Nunca Más [Never Again]: Part II. H, 20 September 1984, found at http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm [Accessed 10/10/20].

was arrested on 11 April 1976 whilst on the company grounds at the Ford factory in General Pacheco.³⁴ He had been elected as the branch delegate in 1970, under the authorisation of Argentina's automotive industry workers union, SMATA, and, to his mind, maintained 'good relations' with the company up until his arrest.³⁵ In his testimony, however, he comments on an 'abrupt change in relations between the company' and his colleagues in the immediate aftermath of the coup.³⁶ From the 25 March 1976 onwards, Troiani and his colleagues claim to have become 'aware of the first arrests within the factory', which quickly escalated to three people a day being 'taken away' by people in military uniform.³⁷ In compliance with Ford's need to remain publicly oblivious to the human rights abuses, Troiani's wife was sent a telegram ordering her husband to report to work, or face dismissal. However, Troiani remains confident that the company was fully aware of his kidnapping citing the fact that the soldiers who carried out the kidnapping were driving company branded vehicles.³⁸ Moreover, when asking if he would need his documents, Troiani was told by the soldiers that he would not 'need them where [he was] going'.³⁹ Having realised that the company was involved in her husband's disappearance, his wife sent a telegram to the managers, met with the manager of Labour relations, Señor Fernández, and ultimately received fortnightly payments to keep quiet. Troiani's testimony and the actions of Ford in response to his disappearance, confirm the company's direct

complicity. No efforts were taken by Ford to find him and, as a member of SMATA, he was an obvious target for the company to want to disappear.

Troiani's testimony also provides insight into another way that Ford became complicit in the disappearances. In addition to 'subversive' lists and onsite clandestine detention centres, the company had a contract to supply vehicles to the military. Troiani recalls the soldiers driving a Ford F-100, a model which he himself had previously worked on.⁴⁰ Whilst the Ford F-100 was one vehicle used by the military, the Ford Falcon is perhaps best known for its role in the disappearances and has become a symbol of the dictatorship and of terror for the Argentine public. With its well-recognised role as a military vehicle, Ford put an advertisement in *La Nación*, promoting the Ford Falcon's supremacy on the streets and calling the vehicle, and its driver, 'champions'.⁴¹ Ford's history of actively supporting the military regime and their aims, meant they saw no shame in advertising a vehicle feared by the public because of its links to the military junta. In a declassified document from 1977, the Interior Minister, General Albano Jorge Harguindeguy, requested 90 Ford Falcons and, more suspiciously, he asked for them to be 'unidentifiable' and 'untraceable to state agencies'.⁴² In all the accounts of kidnappings between 1976 and 1983 that the journalist, Raúl Marzo, had heard, he remarks on the one thing they had in common - 'the dark green Ford Falcon'.⁴³ Even today the Falcon is still recognised as a symbol of terror or a 'death-mobile'

¹⁴ Kelly Hearn, 'Ford's past in Argentina', *The Nation*, 20 April 2006, found at <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/fords-past-argentina/> [Accessed 04/01/2021].

³⁵ Testimony of Pedro Norberto Troiani (file No. 1638) extracted from 'CONADEP Report: Nunca Más [Never Again]: Part II. H', 20 September 1984, found at http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/neveragain/neveragain_001.htm [Accessed 10/10/20].

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Kelly Hearn, 'Ford's past in Argentina', *The Nation*, 20 April 2006, found at <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/fords-past-argentina/> [Accessed 04/01/2021].

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Testimony of Pedro Norberto Troiani (file No. 1638) extracted from 'CONADEP Report: Nunca Más [Never Again]: Part II. H', 20 September 1984, found at http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/neveragain/neveragain_001.htm [Accessed 10/10/20].

⁴¹ *La Nación*, 2 January 1977, found at <https://news.google.co.uk/newspapers?nid=BZGggv0hN9sC&dat=19770101&printsec=frontpage&hl=en> [Accessed 11/11/20].

⁴² 'The Order that the Dictatorship gave for the Purchase of Green Falcon without Patents', *Clarín*, 23 March 2006, found at https://www.clarin.com/ediciones-antteriores/orden-dio-dictadura-compra-falcon-verdes-patentes_0_rJ-boqrk0Ye.html#:~:text=El%2016%20de%20diciembre%20se,garant%C3%ADa%20y%20forma%20de%20pago. [Accessed 01/09/20].

⁴³ Raúl Marz, 'The curse of the Ford Falcon: How an Argentinian classic became a symbol of evil', *Medium*, 23 February 2016, found at <https://medium.com/history-on-wheels/the-curse-of-the-ford-falcon-36cda9a8f97f> [Accessed 06/01/2021].

as the Argentine psychologist, Eduardo Pavlovsky, comments, to Argentinians who lived at the time of the regime.⁴⁴ The lasting impact is shown by the words of Miriam Lewin, a 49-year-old journalist who was kidnapped in a Ford Falcon and states that the car remains ‘a symbol of repression.’⁴⁵

As the attorney, Urquiza, summarises, Ford was just ‘one more gear in the machinery of state terrorism.’⁴⁶ Both Ford and the military had mutual incentive to suppress unionist activity and, whilst the company was discrete in their actions, members of the military made little effort to conceal their collaboration with the company. Jorge Ernesto Berguier, a former soldier working on the grounds of the Pacheco plant, openly admitted in 2005 that his commanding officer had said, in front of Ford employees, ‘we’re going to detain subversives, and we’re going to eat lunch at Ford. This is the company’s collaboration with the armed forces. You have to be thankful.’⁴⁷ There is, therefore, much evidence of Ford’s involvement in the disappearances of their own employees as well as evidence of the company’s communication and collaboration with the military. The evidence of testimonies confirms the way Ford pinpointed which unionists to target, supplied the military with vehicles and hosted a place to detain the victims and it has taken until recently for the executives, Muller and Sibilla, to be brought to justice. The image below depicts a mass demonstration in Buenos Aires on 24 March 2019, where ex-Ford employees, who survived their kidnappings, came out in support. The banner reads, ‘The Ford trial: a workers’ victory’ (See Figure 6).



Figure 6: A Mass demonstration in Buenos Aires, banner reads: ‘The Ford Trial: a workers’ victory’, 24 March 2019, photo by Victoria Basualdo, accessed 14/10/20, via <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/40813-the-ford-trial-in-argentina-a-workers-victory.html>

The scholarship drawn upon throughout this study reflects the under researched nature of this field, with most written only in the last 10 years. Court trials concerned with corporate involvement in Argentine human rights abuses continue to throw up new detail and the increased global focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has encouraged greater critical engagement. Defined by Certanec as, ‘a concept whereby business entities voluntarily incorporate social, environmental and ethical standards into their operations in order to improve the lives of employees, the local community and society as a whole’, the UN, alongside non-legal organisations, have increased efforts to ensure CSR and promote transparency, integrity and accountability.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Eduardo Pavlovsky cited in Karen Roberts, ‘The Falcon Remembered’, *NACLA Report on the Americas Magazine*, 25 September 2007, found at <https://nacla.org/article/falcon-remembered> [Accessed 06/01/2021]; Raúl Marz, ‘The curse of the Ford Falcon: How an Argentinian Classic became a Symbol of Evil’, *Medium*, 23 February 2016, found at <https://medium.com/history-on-wheels/the-curse-of-the-ford-falcon-36cda9a8f97f> [Accessed 06/01/2021].

⁴⁵ Miriam Lewin, cited in Mike Culpepper, ‘The Ford Falcon: death mobile’, *Shrine of Dreams*, 27 October 2011, found at <https://shrineofdreams.wordpress.com/2011/10/27/the-ford-falcon-death-mobile/> [Accessed 07/01/2021].

⁴⁶ Ojea Urquiza, cited in Bill Van Auken, ‘Ford Motor charged as accomplice in Argentina’s Dirty War’, *World Socialist Web Site*, 25 February 2006, found at <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2006/02/ford-f25.html> [Accessed 07/01/2021].

⁴⁷ Jorge Ernesto Berguier cited in The Preliminary Statement of Pedro Norberto Troiani, ‘Solicitud de declaraciones indagatorias’ [Preliminary Statements] Translated by Kitty Fellowes, *Equipa Nikzor*, Case 18.018/02, Molinari, Antonio vs. Ford Personnel, 25 August 2005, p. 9.

⁴⁸ The UN has improved its oversight of abuses through the creation of the UN Special Representative for Business and Human Rights (2005) and the adoption of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011. The ‘Guiding Principles’ established that the state had a duty to protect its people from the human rights abuses of third parties and that better platforms for victims to be heard are needed; United Nations, *UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights* (New York, 2011); See Ana Certanec, ‘The Connection between Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Respect for Human Rights’, *Economics and social issues review*, 10 (2019).

In Argentina, increased focus on CSR and transitional justice is what brought Ford to trial and what will, in the future, hold further corporations accountable for their involvement in the human rights abuses between 1976 and 1983.⁴⁹ Institutions, such as the Argentinean Institute Corporate Social Responsibility, have been established and the work of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch remains fundamental to international awareness of human rights abuses in the country. Increased knowledge of Argentine corporate complicity in the systematic targeting of unionists, during the military regime of 1976–83, has sparked legal action and bold initiatives to hold businesses accountable. In addition, there are increasingly frequent references to the military dictatorship as a ‘civil-military’ dictatorship, revealing how even the language now supports the link between the military and business sectors in the broader, repressive apparatus of those years.⁵⁰ Argentina has gone further than other countries in the prosecution of corporations, including Ford, but much remains to be done to hold corporations to account - and to bring either justice, or closure, to the victims and families of the state sanctioned abuses which define Argentina’s ‘dirty war’.



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⁴⁹ Whilst Ford, Mercedes and Ledesma executives have been prosecuted, other Argentine corporations, including the steel company, Acindar, the bus company, La Veloz del Norte and the mining firm, Minera Aguilar, amongst others, are also currently under investigation. See Victoria Basualdo, ‘The Argentine Dictatorship and Labour (1976-1983): A Historiographical Essay’, *International Labour and Working-Class History*, 8 (2018), pp. 8-26.

⁵⁰ Connie de la Vega, Amol Mehra, Alexandra Wong, ‘Holding businesses accountable for human rights violations: Recent developments and next steps’, *International policy analysis* (2011); Leigh Payne, Tricia Olsen, Gabriel Pereira, ‘Corporate complicity in Argentina: A preliminary Analysis’, *International Studies Association* (2014), p. 1.

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